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"KANT'S VIEWS OF SPACE ABOUT 1769. " 
"Sich auf Ein Handwerk zu 
beschraenken, ist das Beste. 
Fuer den geringsten Topf wird 
es immer ein Handwerk, fuer 
den bessern eine Kunst, und 
der beste, wenn er Eins tut, 
.tut er alles, oder, um weniger 
paradox zu sein, in dem Einen 
was er recht tut, sieht er das 
Gleichnis von allem was recht 
getan wird." 
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(d) 
Synopsis: 
(1) . In his paper of 1768, Kant maintained the t space 
is an absolute reality. (pp. 1 - 4.) 
(2) In his study of the Clarke-Leibniz Controversy, 
which he undertook immediately after writing his per 
of 1768, Kant discovered: 
(a) . .Both Clarke and Leibniz maintained that the 
problem of the infinity of the world in space can 
not be given a necessary answer. (pp. 4 -5.) 
(b) Clarke maintained that whether the world be 
finite or infinite, it exists in an infinite space, 
which is a real quantity, or a property of God. 
(pp. 11 - 13). 
(c). Leibniz maintained that whether the world be 
finite or infinite, it is commensurate with space, 
which is an ideal order of the possible relation- 
ships of the bodies of the world to one another. 
(pp. 5 - 7.) 
(d). Leibniz maintained that the world is 
necessarily infinite in quantity, but that it is 
possibly finite in respect to space. (pp. 9 10). 
(e) 
(e) . Clarke showed that a world infinite in 
quantity and finite in respect to space is im- 
possible, since Newtonian principles of motion 
will not hold in regard to it. (pp. 14 -1). 
(f) . Clarke did not show that the world is 
necessarily infinite, alb he ielt, therefore,the 
problem of extramundane space unanswered. 
(pp. lb-16.) 
(3) . Kant concluded from his study of the Clarke -Leibniz 
Controversy, that there is neither relative space nor 
absolute space, since 
(a) Leibniz's view of the infinity of the world 
violated Newtonian principles. (pp. 16 -18); 
(b) Clarke's view of absolute space left the 
problem of extramundane space unanswered. (pp. 16 -18). 
(4) . This is the equivalent of Diss. lb. D. without the 
truth in 
argument based upon the nature of /Geometry (pp. 18-20). 
(5) . Kant turned to the nature of space as a concept 
of the understanding. (pp. 18-20). 
(f) 
(6). With the aid of Luler he discovered; 
(a) The concept of space is not abstracted from 
sense (Diss. lb i). (pp. 21 -24), 
(b) In contrast to the usual general concepts 
such as "extension" or "man ", space is a singular 
representation (Diss. lb. B), a pure intuition 
(Dias. lb. C) and a form of intuition (Diss. lb. E). 
(pp. 24 -Z7). 
(7) . In this fruitful line of thinking, he realized that 
propositions in Geometry are synthetic and á priori, 
and used this fact to reenforce his arguments for space as 
a pure intuition and as a form of intuition. (pp. 35 -37) 
and (pp. 43-47). 
(8). Vaihinger is partly wrong when he says (II. 434), 
that in answer to the problem of the nature of judgments 
in pure Geometry, Kant made space a pure intuition; 
and in answer to the problem of the nature of judgments 
in applied Geometry, Kant made space a form of intuition. 
The doctrines of space were reached first independently of 
(g) 
truth in 
the specific problems about the nature of /Geometry. 
After the discovery that propositions in Geometry 
are a priori and synthetic, Kant used this fact in 
1770 (as Vaihinger says) as his main argument for the 
doctrines of space as a pure intuition (in pure Geometry) 
and as a form of intuition (in applied). (pp. 37 -42). 
(9). Kiehl and Fischer believe wrongly that Kant's 
main concern in 1768 was to show that space was ari 
intuition. (pp. 4 -43) . 
(10). Kant's introduction of the example of incon- 
gruent counterparts into Dias. lb. C. shows that he 
regarded that example as particularly significant in 
his doctrine of space as a pure intuition. (pp. 30-32). 
(11). That doctrine may be developed just as well in 
contrast to any other particulars. Kant omitted the 
example of incongruent counterparts from the Aesthetic. 
(pp. 28-3_0). 
(12). In the first paragraph to Diss. lb. cor., Kant 
contrasted the relation of the parts of space to the whole 
with the usual part -whole relation of determining pert 
to determined whole. (pp. 48 -49 ). 
(h) 
(13). In spite of his contrary view in the rest of 
of Diss. lb., Kant said at the end of Diss. 15. cor. 
that space is abstracted from an activity of the mind. 
The former view is more in line with teaching in the 
Aesthetic; the latter with the analytic. (pp. 49-54 ). 
(14). In Diss. lb, and in both the metaphysical and 
the transcendental expositions of space in the 
Aesthetic, Kant treated space as a conscious representation. 
(pp. 55 -60 ). 
(15). This point of view is in contrast to the original 
investigation of the concept of space in 1769, and in 
contrast to the later view of the Analytic. (pp. r5 --30 ) . 
(16). Kant put two arguments in Diss. 15. A., in the one 
of which he treated sensation as a psychological piocesa; 
in the other, as a psychological fact. They unite to 
show that space is non -empirical. (pp. 60-65 ). 
a. He put the first argument in Aes. I. (pp 65 -67). 
b. He put the second in Aes. H. (pp. 67 -68 ). 
(17). In Diss. 15. A., and in Aes. I., and II., Kant was 
dealing with space as a conscious representation. 
(18). The argument in Aes.II, which Kant took over from 
Dias. lb. A., is the doctrine of the relative necessity 
(i) 
of space for outer appearances. The doctrine of 
the absolute necessity of space is not in the Biss. 
Two main arguments in Les. II. deal with these two 
types of necessity. (pp. 68 -81.) 
(18 -a). The argument in Aes. I. and the doctrine of 
relative necessity in Aes. II., unite to show that 
space is non -empirical. (p. 74.) 
(19). The doctrine of the absolute necessity of 
space means that space is a necessary representation, 
or that space is at the basis of all intuitive think- 
ing. (pp. 68 -74.) 
(20). In spite of evidence to the contrary, the 
doctrine of relative necessity is not a corollary of 
the doctrine of absolute necessity. (pp. 74 -81.) 
(20-a). Similarly, pure Geometry does not include 
applied Geometry. (pp. 81-83.) 
(21) . In Les. A. IV., B. III., Kant took over the 
argument af piss. 15. B., omitting the problem of the 
boundlessness of space. He concluded from the contrast 
of the representa tion of space with the usual general 
concepts that space is non -conceptual, hence intuitive. 
(pp. 85 -86.) 
(J) 
(22) . He took over also the argumc.t of Diss. 15. 
C.n. and piss. 15. cor., (first paragraph), where he 
had contrasted the usual part -whole relation with the 
relation of the parts of space to the Whole. (pp. 86 -87.) 
(23) . He omitted the problem of the infinity of space 
until A. V. (pp. 87 -88.) 
(24) . Hi: contrast in A. IV., B. III., between "space" 
and "man" is a contrast between two conscious representa- 
tions and not between logical abstractions. The whole 
of space determines the parts, whi ch are limits . (p?o . 88 -90 . ) 
(25) . In the first sentence of e.. V., Kant meant the 
contemplated infinity of space. (pp. 90 -91.) 
(26). In the argument of A. V., he showed only that 
space is conceived as infinite, and did not shay that 
space is non-conceptual. His argument even leads to the 
opposite conclusion. (pp. 91 -92.) 
(27). In the first sentence of B. IV. he emphasized 
that he meant the contemplated infinity cf space. In 
his new argument he showed validly that space is non -con- 
ceptual, but he did not shvav that space is a contemplated 
infinite whole. There are an infinite number cf 
representations in space, not under it. (pp. 92 -96.) 
(k) 
(23 ) . In 1770 and in the mes. , he identified state, 
the pure fo nn of intuition, with space, the pure intuition. 
He attempted to discover in the la tter all of the character- 
istics of the former. (pp. 96-103.) 
(29) . In two parts of Diss. 15., Kant assumed that there 
is an activity of riind frcxn which space is abstracted. 
(pp. 104 -107.) 
(30) . There are three possible types of activity of 
the mind, one of which turns out to be nBaningless: 
a. An intellectual activity yielding a sensitive 
whole of space; (the doctrine of tvo morts 
of the Dis s.) ; 
b. .gin activity beginning with the sensitive and 
yie1din _, a sensit ive "oh. oh of space ; ( the doc trine 
of 3. 160n) . This doctrine is meaningless. 
c. !"Ln activity beginning ith the ob je cts of sense 
(sensuous manifold.) and yielding the sensitive 
whole of space; (the doctrine of the Analytic.) 
(pp. 107-108 and pp. 121 -123.) 
(31 ) . Kant reconciled the opposing doctrines of space 
in the Diss. by means of a dualism between sense and 
intelligence, and stated the doctrine of the first type of 
activity. (pp. 108 -111.) 
(1) 
(52) . The second type of activity (assumed by riant 
in B. 160n.) is meaningless . It is c omits tible neither i th 
the .Oiss. and the -tes., nor the .na. (pp. 107 -108); 
and (pp. 127 -130). 
(33). Only the third type of activity is compatible 
with the teo.ching of the Ana., and it is essential to 
Tne doctrine of 
that teaching. (p. 108) ; and (pp. 130 -131) . /t -lis third 
type cf activity contradicts the four arguments of the 
.es. (pp. 137 -139) . 
(34) . Either Kant was aware of the conflict between the 
doctrines of the zna. and the ries., or it canot be said 
that he grafted one upon the other. (pp. 111-112.) 
(35). In the theory of knowledge which Kant developed 
after 1770 intuition and conception are united, both 
being necessary for knowledge. (pp. 112 -113.) 
(36) . Knowledge in form (in pure Mathematics) is 
different, on the one hand from knowledge (in applied 
Mathematics), and on the other, from thinking, which is 
not knowledge. (pp. 113-114.) 
(37) . In pure Mathematics we do not have knowledge, but 
only knowledge in form. By means of knowledge in form we 
determine a priori the limits of knowledge. (pp. 114-117.) 
(m) 
(38). Space is determined by a synthetic activity of 
the underst nding which must begin with the sensuous mani- 
fold. This activity yields a pure manifold (in pure 
Mathematics), and a pure form of the sensuous manifold 
(in applied Lathan-atlas). (pp. 117-119.) 
(39) . Space is only the form for setting objects of- 
sensation together. If the objects set together are 
removed, nothing remains. (p. 119.) 
(40) . Since the activity of the understanding, which 
is presupposed by space, begins with the sensuous manifold, 
sense -experience is prior to space. This contradicts Diss. 
15. A. and Aes. I. (pp. 119-121.) 
(41). since nothing remains after abstracting from the 
objects of sense, space is not at the basis of external 
appearances. This contradicts Di ss. 15. A., and II. 
(pp. 119-121.) 
(42) . Since the sensuous manifold. is prior to space, 
the parts of space precede and determine the whole. This 
contradicts Aes. B. III. (pp. 119-121.) 
(43) . Since the sensuous manifold is prior to space, 
the riarticur representations of space are under it and 
not in it. This contradicts -es. B. IV. (pp. 119 -121.) 
(n) 
(44) . The f our arguments of the 1 =es. st_nd or fall 
the dualism of 1770. (pp. 104 -141, esp. p. 12 5.) 
(45). In 1770, Kant did not face the c,testion: how 
an activity of the mind could yield the concept cf' space. 
His thoroughgoing dualism makes this less unsatisfactory 
then than in the Critique. (pp. 124-127.) 
(46) . He formulated at B. 160n. the doctrine that 
space is preceded by a synthesis, which does not begin 
wi th the manifold of sense. (pp. 121 -123. ) 
(47) . Had he faced the cu esti on of how such a synthesis 
could begin, he would have realized that: 
a. If there i s a manifold other than the sensuous 
manifold, with which a synthesis can begin, then 
it must begin with the very thing which it is 
supposed to yield, namely, space. (pp. 127 -130.) 
One particular space is "space" as much as any 
other particular space. (p. 129.) 
b. The only kind csf' synthesis which begins ith no 
manifold (pure or sensuous) is an intellectual 
synthesis, the possibility of which he tad rejected 
with the dualism of 1770. (pp. 129 -]30.) 
(o) 
c. The only kind of synthesis compatible with his 
point of view in the Ana., is a synthesis which 
begins with the manifold of sense. (pp. 130-131.) 
(48). His teaching in the Analytic (including B. 160n) 
contradicts his teaching in the four arguments on space 
in the Aesthetic. (pp. 130 -131 and pp. 137-138.) 
(49) . Cassirer recognizes a unity in the diversity of 
the doctrines in the Critique. This unity is attained 
from the point of view in the ;analytic. (pp. 131 -132.) 
(50) . Kant' s point of vi ew in his first formulation of 
the doctrines of space in 1769 is nearer to the point of 
view of the Ana. than to that of the -es. (pp. 132 -]34. ) 
(51) . According to the point of view ce the Ana., 
intuitions and conceptions cannot be separated, but they 
may be treated as separated, and knowle d ;e cal not run 
counter to the results of this treatment. (pp. 131-137.) 
(52) . In Diss. 15. cor. (at the end) , Kant was correct 
in saying that there is an activity of the mind, but 
wrong as to the nature of that activity. (pp. 139-141.) 
(53) . In the rest of Diss. 15.. (with the possible 
exception of the example of incongruent counterparts) 
and in the four arguments in the 2-Les., Kai t was -: ror ; to 
assume that there is no activity of the mind. (pp. 139-141.) 
(p) 
(54) . Throughout piss. 15. end the nes. , he was wrong 
to assume' the dualism between sense and intelligence. 
(pp. 139 -141.) 
(55) . In the light of the 'conflicting views of space 
in the Critique, it becomes clear that Kant could unify 
his doctrine of the contemplated whole of space and 
the activity of the mind in Diss. 35., only on the 
assumption of the dualism of 1770. (pp. 139-141.) 
(56) . With the rejection of that dualism after 1770) 
the arguments in Diss. 15., and in the Aes., require radical 
revision. Kant retained them in the Critique either because 
he was not aware of the contradictions involved, or be- 
cause he saw how great an alteration is required to remove 
these contradictions. (pp. 139-141.) 

In 1768, Kant wrote his short paper, "Regions in 
l . 
, the doctrine of an 
:Space." In it he accepted / absoluté space. 
The example of incongruent counterparts 2) shows that, 
in nature and in Geometry, certain relations exist which 
can be formulated only by reference to absolute primary 
space. A pair of human hands or two eoual incongruent 
spherical triangles are alike in regard to internal 
arrangement; but one can not be superimposed upon the 
other. Their difference may be described only in reference 
to a space in which they are located. Kant agreed `5) with 
4.) 
Euler that the Leibnizian doctrine of space as a relation 
between bodies is inadequate to explain the laws of motion. 
Euler's critique of Leibnizian space is valid, but he did 
not prove that, to explain these laws, space must be an 
absolute reality. The evidence in Mechanics is evidence 
for the reality of absolute space only in a negative way. 
That is, it disproves that space is a relation, which 
Leibniz had maintained it to be; but it does not prove that 
it is an absolute reality. Kant's belief in Newtonian 
1.) English Translation, rlandyside, 1929. 
Original, i:Ieiner, Phil. Bibliothek, 46b. 
2.) See Handyside, (pp. 25 -27.) for Kant's full statement of 
the problem of incongruent counterparts. 
3.) Handyside, p. 21. 
4.) Euler, "Essai sur l'Espace et le Temps." 1748; esp. 
Sec. V. VI. 
-1- 
Mechanics had led him to accept the absolute reality 
of space as far as required by the principles in that 
science. In 1768 he realized that he would have to 
adapt his position in every respect to suit their truth. 
His question was whether, in working out their implica- 
tions, he would be forced to take the position that 
space was absolute, and prune away the difficulties from 
that doctrine, or whether some alternate account of the 
Newtonian position would do away with the necessity of 
absolute space. At the beginning of this period, he was 
well aware of these two possibilities. Either he must 
accept the concept of absolute space, and answer the 
1.) 
criticisms of Leibniz , or he must reject it, and show 
1.) 
that Clarke had gone astray in accepting it. In either 
case, he was squarely accepting the principles of Newtonian 
idechanics. In a search into the evidence for absolute 
space, he found the examples of incongruent counterparts 
in nature and Geometry. These show -- he held in 1768 -- 
that other types of knowledge give supporting evidence to 
the interpretation of Newtonian i.iechanics which adopts space 
as an absolute reality. During the writing of his paper, 
he realized that the objections of Leibniz were unanswered, 
1.) See below p. 8 and p. 9. 
-2- 
and that they would have to be considered at once. He 
knew that his thought had only been thrown tentatively 
in the one direction, rather than in the other by this 
new evidence, but he was resolved first to formulate his 
new conclusions. The hypothesis of his paper was the 
reality of absolute space. Could this be retained? To 
see whether he was on the right track would require 
immediate testing. The basis for this process would be the 
tenets of Newtonian Mechanics, and the arguments built 
up for and against absolute space by previous protagonists, 
mainly Leibniz and Clarke. He closed his paper, therefore, 
with an admission of the difficulties of the doctrine 
which he was adopting in spite of the evidence which his 
examples carried with them, and turned to the Controversy 
of Clarke and Leibniz, thinking of the main argument of 
1.) 
Leibniz against absolute space, namely, that such 
space involves space outside of the universe, if the universe 
realize 
be finite. This study led him soon to % t:I t the problem 
of extramundane space involves the questions concerning th 
infinity of the world. If the world be infinite, does 
that mean infinite in space? if the world be infinite in 
l.j Leibniz: 5, 29. The numbers cited in reference to 
Leibniz and Clarke refer to Letter and Section, 
respectively, of their correspondence. 
-3- 
space, does not that solve the difficulty of extra - 
mundane space, because there can be none? If the 
world be finite in space, is there extramundane space, 
or does. space end finitely with the world? ';that 
light would a renewed study of the Controversy of 
1.) 3.) 
1715 throw on these questions? 
Is the world finite or infinite in respect to 
space and time? In his study of the Clarke -Leibniz 
Controversy, Kant found that neither adversary took the 
position that the worldñecessarily finite or infinite. 
What is there in the nature of this question, which 
forced both Leibñiz and Clarke to refrain from a necessary 
answer? ' Ihy could each of them speak òf the possibility 
of the world being either finite or infinite, and then 
go on to draw conclusions about space and time and the 
world from both possible points of view? If there can 
be no necessary answer, from which point of view was ' thi s 
fact correctly established? Clarke's position was that 
whether the world be finite or infinite, space and time 
are necessarily real and infinite. Leibniz's position 
2. 
was that whether the world be finite or infinite, it 
4.) 
coincides necessarily with space and time. These 
1.) Vaihinger II. pp. 436, 529 -531; Cassirer, II p. 621n. 
2.) Clarke 4, 7; 5, 41. . 
3.) For the full titles cf the comm entaries referred 
to see Bibliographyt above pp. b -d. 
4.) Leibniz 4, 41: 5, 47. 
-4- 
positions are opposing but not contradictory. It is 
possible to hold with Clarke that space and time are 
necessarily infinite, and, at the same time, to hold with 
Leibniz that the world coincides necessarily with it. 
This is a position which both claimed to have avoided. 
Yet Clarke said Leibniz had taken it, and Leibniz said 
Clarke had done so. 
Leibniz's position in regard to these questions was 
as follows: He made s ;pace and time solely a. relation 
to one another 
of things (bodies/. For him the only reasonable 
ouestions concerning the beginning of the world are 
1.) 
questions concerning how bodies actually began. Iie 
thought that Clarke's main error was his acceptance of 
an absolute real space. By this acceptance such a meaning- 
less ouestion is raised as why the world had not begun 
a number of years sooner. Clarke's position led inevitably 
to one of two conclusions, Leibniz maintained. Either 
no world exists, or it has been created before any assign- 
able time, and is necessarily eternal. By parity of 
argument, it is also necessarily infinite. Only by 
regarding time and space as relations between things, and 
non -existent without them, is this confusion avoided. 
1. Leibniz 4, 15. 
-5- 
Is the world eternal? This was for Leibniz a meaning- 
less ouestion when referring to anything else than a 
1.) 
relation of successive things. Is the world infinite? 
This was meaningless whèn referring to anything else than 
1.) 
a relation of simultaneous things. If space be 
absolute and real apart from things related, then any 
existing world is necessarily infinite. Leibniz believed 
that on Clarke's premises the world has to be accepted as 
necessarily infinite, or its existencehas to be denied. 
From his own premisses, Leibniz believed that such a choice 
is not necessary. Space and time are, for him, coincident 
with the world. They are ideal orders containing the 
possibility for the relationship of bodies among them- 
selves as coexistent or successively existent. ns such, 
they lose all meaning apart from bodies and are imaginary. 
The question of the infinity of the world according to 
space and time concerns only the infinity of these relation- 
ships. It is not a necessary question. It is not 
necessarily one question, or several parallel questions.. 
1.) Leibniz 4, 41. Space "est cet ordre qui fait que 
les corps sont Situables, et par lecuel ils ont une 
Situation entre eux en existant ensemble, comme le 
temps est cet ordre par rapport à leur position successive." 
- 6- 
To ask whether coexisting things are related infinitely, 
is not to ask diether successive things are related 
eternally. To ask whether successive things are related 
eternally a par to ante is not to ask whether they are 
1.) 
similarly related a arte post. None of these are 
necessary questions, and the answer to one of than in 
no way affects th e answers to the others. Ther vary in 
reasonableness. 
In his study of the controversy in 1769, Kant 
tried to combine Leibniz's view of the infinity of the 
2.) 
world with his own position of 1768 that there 
is absolute real space. His thinking divided itself 
into two parts. On the one hand, he was defending 
the concept cif' absolute space against Leibniz's question 
in regard to extramundane space. He re,' ;arded all argumats 
for absolute space unsati sfactory unless they answered 
that question. On the other hand, he was testing the con- 
cept of relative space with the requirements cf Newtonian 
1.) Leibniz 5, 74. Nuand l'étendue de la matière 
n'auroit point de bornes, il ne suit point que 
sa durée n' or ait pas non plus - - -. De plus, le 
commencement du monde ne deroge point á l'infinit6( 
de sa durée a parte post, - --" 
2.) R. 1417 --- "Wir mússen uns aber beim Anfange aller Dinge viol sine Relation derselben a rte post 
gedenken, aber keine a parte anti, also kein 
Verhaltnis der :elt zu einer vorher verflossenen 
Zeit." Also R. 1416, 1419. Adickes p. 124 -125; 
Cassirer hII, p. 621n. (R. mans Reflexion, .Erdmann's 
numbering.) 
7 - 
crincioles. He asked whether Leibniz's doctrine of 
the infinity of the v.orld was satisfactory. If this 
view were found to be compatible with Newtonian teach- 
ing, the attack of Clarke upon the concept of relative 
space would have been found to be unsuccessful; and, 
if, in the meantime, Clarke had failed to answer Leibniz's 
problem with reference to extramundane space, Kant would 
be forced to reject the concept of absolute space, and to 
accept that of relative space in its stead. If 
Leibniz's doctrine of the infinity of the world were 
however, 
found,/co be incompatible with the laws in iiechanics, 
the attack of Clarke upon the concept of relative space 
would have been found to be successful; and, if, in the 
meantime, Clarke had answered Leibniz's problem with 
reference to extramundane space, Kant would be forced to 
reject the concept of relative space, and accept that 
of absolute space in its stead. K_amt searched into the 
arguments of Clarke and Leibniz with these two possibilities 
1.) 
in mind. The light of 1769 had not dawned. He was 
testing Clarke's defense of absolute space in the face of 
Leibniz's attack. Would that defense answer the question 
1.) R. 4. 
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about space beyond the world? IIe was testing Leibniz's 
defense of relative space against Clarke's attack. 
Would Leibniz's view of the infinity of the world with- 
stand the evidence of the truth in Mechanics? The third 
possibility, which he did not yet see, was that neither 
defense would succeed. Neither the concept of absolute 
space, nor the concept of relative space would bear the 
destructive criticisms wielded against it. Kant was soon 
to find that Clarke destroyed completely Leibniz's view 
of the infinity of the world, but failed (like Euler) 
to defend the concept of absolute space against Leibniz. 
The term "infinite" was used in two senses by Leibniz 
in the Controversy. In regard to quantity or mass, he 
believed the universe to be indeterminate. That is, no 
quantity of matter may be assigned to it. In this sense, 
the universe is necessarily infinite, or indefinite. He 
had in mind a sort of maximum and minimum density, the 
absolute "plenum ", and the absolute "vacuum'', neither of 
which, from his point ctf view, exists. It is impossible to 
set a fixed quantity of matter between them, and say that 
-9- 
1.) 
it is the quantity of the universe. Somewhere 
between e:ists the matter of the universe, but no bounds 
may be set to it. It may be given no assignable 
quantity. There is no such thing as the amount of matter 
in the universe. In sharp contrast to this view of the 
"infinite ", he considered infinite duration and extension. 
The indeterminate quantity of matter in the universe 
involves in no way, infinity of duration or extension. 
In his view, there is necessarily no such thing as the 
amount of matter in the universe. But this means in no 
way that the universe is necessarily either infinitely 
extended or enduring. It is possible that, in the latter 
respects, the world is either finite or infinite. Clarke, 
on the other hand, believed that these two sorts of 
infinity are inseparable. From him, there is only one 
sort of infinity, and this includes mass, and extension 
and duration. A world of infinite mass with finite 
extension_ and duration is impossible since Newtonian 
2) 
principles. of motion will not hold in regard to it. 
Either the :orld is infinite in every respect or in none. 
In the latter case, its mass, extension and duration 
1.) Leibniz 4, 21. "Il n'y a point de raison possible 
qui puisse limiter la ouantite`de la matiére. 
Ainsi cette limitation ne sauroit avoir lieu." 4. 
Postscript. "Il n'est point possible qu'il y ait 
un Principe de determiner la Proportion de la 
matiére, ou du rempli au vuide, ou du vuide au 
plein." 
2.) Clarke 5, 73 -75; see below p. 15n. 
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would be calculable, as well as its motion in space 
and time. It was Leibniz's double treatment of the 
problem of the infinity of the world which brought his 
position into conflict with Newtonian principles. To 
speak of a finite world whose mass is incalculable, is 
contrary to the meaning of "finite" in 1.Lechanics. In that 
science, a finite body is one whose mass is calculable. 
If there be finite bodies whose masses are not calculable, 
then their motions likewise cannot be calculated. Clarke 
and Kant tested Leibniz's position with Newtonian prin- 
ciples, and found in it this serious flay. 
Clarke's position in regard to the questions of 
the infinity of the world was as follows: He said 
that it is possible for the world to have begun sooner 
or later than it actually began, and that it is 
possible for it to end sooner or later than it will end, 
1.) 
because it is in infinite sp ce and eternal time. 
Infinity and eternity contain an eternal number of possible 
beginnings and endings, and possible sizes. From 
1.) Clarke 4, 15. "It was no imossibility for God to 
make the World sooner or l!:ter than he did; nor is 
it at all impossible for him to destroy it sooner 
or later than it shall be destroyed t' 
his point of view, if matter and space (bodies and space) 
be the same, then the world is necessarily infinite and 
eternal, because space and time are infinite and eternal. 
If the world be coincident and coextensive with time aad 
space, it shares their eternity and infinity. He referred 
here to Leibniz's position that space is the relation 
between things as commensurate with them, anl dependent upon 
them for existence. From his ov : pd.nt oe vie r - -- C]a xk e 
maintained - -- the necessity of considering the world 
infinite and eternal is avoided, because the other pos.bility 
remains of having the world begin and end quite finitely 
within eternal time, and also have finite bounds within 
infinite space. But admittedly, this passibility would 
1.) 
entail an acceptance of extramundane space and time. 
Clarke denied Leibniz's charge that he must accept the 
world as necessarily infinite, and charged t1- t Leibniz 
must accept it as necessarily infinite. 
Clarke in no way gave up the possibility of the 
world's being infinite and eternal, that is, of the world's 
1.) Clarke 4, 7. 'tExtramundane Space (if the material world 
be finite in its Dimensions), is not imaginary but 
real." (Also, 5, 46.) 
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being infinite and eternal in infinite space and eternal 
time. He neither necessarily affirmed nor denied that 
position, for he was concerned only to show that space and 
time are infinite real quantities or properties. In his 
language, the world is dependent upon the will of God; that 
is, it is possible for it to be eternal, or to have begun 
and to end at any moment in an eternity of time. It is 
possible for it to be infinite, or to be bounded at any 
point in an infinity (immensity) of space. But time and 
space themselves are dependent upon the essence (existence) 
of God; they are properties of his essence, or effects of 
1.) 
his essence. Far from it being possible for time to have 
begun or to end at any moment in eternity, or for space to 
be bounded at any point in infinity (immensity) , time seed 
space are eternity and immensity in which such bounds are 
set. Whether there are bounds set to the world, or whether 
it is eternal and infinite, and coincides with time and 
space, concerns only the will of God, and no necessary 
answer can be given; but time and space themselves are 
necessarily infinite because they concern His very existence. 
Any judgment about the will of God is a contingent judgment. 
1.) Clarke 4, 15; 5, 45. 
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Any judgment about His essence is a necessary judgment. 
If there be not coincidence, Clarke believed, there 
has to be space and time empty of matter, although possibly 
1.) 
containing other substances which are not matter. 
Kant saw that only Clarke *s treatment of the problem 
of the infinity of the world is compatible v th the laws 
in Mechanics. The contradiction in Leibniz's point of 'view 
is in regard to the nature of infinity. If the universe 
be quantitatively boundless, it cannot possibly be finite 
in respect to space and time. Clarke showed this by 
reference to Newtonian principles of motion. If the w rld 
be finite in respect to space and time, it is moveable 
according to those principles. But if the world be bound- 
less in quantity, it is infinite in inertia, and it is 
immoveable. Lè.ibniz :was ' P' r-cëd'; théz'er öre ; -- Kant realized-- - 
hither to admit that the world is necessarily finite in 
quantity (mass) and space and time, in vh.ica case its 
motion is calculable; or hold that the world is necessarily 
1. C ar e 4, 9; 4, 10. 
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infinite in respect to space and time as well as in 
quantity. Leibniz claimed that his view allowed 
both the infinitude and the finitude of the world 
as possibilities, despite his claim that it is 
necessarily boundless in quantity. But Kant realized 
that Leibniz was forced either to accept its necessary 
infinitude in every respect or admit that a finite 
1.) 
quantity of matter may be assigned to it. 
exactly 
This was / Clarke's position It was, therefore, 
Clarke's view which alone allowed him satisfactorily 
to accept both the finitude and the infinitude of the 
world as possibilities. Since only Clarke's view was 
properly grounded, it was from that view that a choice 
between the two possibilities had to be sought. He 
found that only Clarke's account of the infinity 
questions was compatible with the facts in Mechanics. 
He clearly formulated Clarke's position. Either the 
world is finite and moveable in an infinite real 
1 arke 5, 73 -75. If he Ma erial niverse can 
possibly - -- be finite and moveable - -- then Space 
(in which that Motion is performed) is manifestly 
independent of matter, but if on the contrary, the 
material Universe cannot be finite and moveable, and 
Space cannot be independent upon matter; then -- it 
follows evidently that God neither can nor ever 
could set bounds to matter, and consequently that 
the material universe must be not only boundless but 
eternal also, both a parte ante and a parte post." 
C 
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quantum of space, or it is infinite and immoveable 
in the same. 4hich s If it be finite, what is the 
nature of the real space beyond it which contains no 
bodies? To prove its necessary infinity would at least 
make unnecessary a. rl answer to this cuestion. Yet 
Clarke offered no way of proving either its finitude 
or its infinitude. He offered only the consolation, 
that, from hispoint of view, either is compatible with 
the truths in Mechanics. 
Kant's study of the Lorresoondence between Clarke 
and Leibniz was complete. Yet it had not been un- 
fruitful.. Both Clarke and Leibniz claimed that the 
question concerning the infinity of the world can not 
be given a necessary answer. Yet Clarke alone is 
justified in making this claim. Leibniz's view is in- 
compatible with the principles in Mechanics; his view 
of relative space is untenable. But Clarke did not 
prove that the world is necessarily infinite; he did 
1.) 
not claim to do so. Leibniz's criticism with re- 
gard to the problem of extramundane space is therefore 
2.) 
quite valid. Kant's study of the Correspondence 
1.) See above 15. n. 
i 
Clarke 5, 73 -75. 
2.) R. 1418. 
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was complete because he recognized finally the nature of 
the difficulty in that dispute. The light of 1769 had 
1.) 
dawned. He found that both Clarke and Leibniz 
had succeeded, and failed. Each had succeeded in destroy- 
ing the view of the other. Each had fai led to mainta. n 
his own view. Clarke had shown that the view of space as 
a relation between existing objects is untenable, because 
the view of the infinity of the world to which it led 
is incompatible with Newtonian principles. Leibniz had 
shown that the view of space as an absolute reality is 
untenable, because, not proving that the world is necessarily 
infinite, it involved the possibility of space beyond the 
world. There is neither absolute space, nor relative 
space. In 1769 Kant reached the same conclusion about 
2.) 
Clarke and Leibniz that in 1768 he had reached about 
Euler. Now (in 1769) he was forced to include his own 
view of 1768 in his criticism. Clarke and Euler and 
Kant, himself, in his own paper of 1768, had professed 
to make a positive argument, and had succeeded only in 
making an effective negative one. They had proved con- 
1.) R. 4. 
2.) Handyside p. 21. 
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elusively that space is not a relation, but they had 
not proved that it is an absolute reality. Likewise, 
Leibniz had professed to make a positive argument, 
and had succeeded only in making an effective negative 
one. He had proved conclusively that space is not an 
absolute reality, but he had not proved that it is a relation. 
The arguments of Kant and Clarke and Euler had broken 
down before Leibniz's argument in reference to extra - 
mundane space. The arguments of Leibniz had broken 
down before Clarke's view of the problem of the infinity 
of the world. ilhey had all four failed because space is 
neither an absolute reality, nor a relation between exist- 
ing bodies. 
What is it Kant turned his attention simply to the 
question: What is the nature of space, as-a concept ci 
1.) 
the understanding? With the aid of Euler's criticism 
2.) 
öf the..doctxine of relative space, Kant sought the answer 
to this question. Kant left the problem of the infinity 
of the world as containing no necessary answer. Space is 
neither an absolute reality, nor a relation between objects. 
He considered the nature of space, as a concept of the 
understanding. 
1.) Adickes, p. 126; Cassirer, II. p. 622n. 
2.) Op. Cit., 5e^c.XIV., "V. 
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To understand how Kant reached his doctrines of space 
as a pure intuition and as a form of intuition in 1769, 
the distinction must be kept in mind between his earliest 
formulation of these doctrines and his formulation of them 
with the reenforcing evidence gained from the nature oï 
judgments in Geometry. Both of these formulations were 
made in 1769 -70. The first was a direct outcome of his 
study of Euler, and is found in those portions of the 
Dissertation which base the doctrine of space as a pure 
intuition directly upon the nature of the concept of space. 
The second is the more significant doctrine, and is the 
result of the insight (gained by tant during or just after 
the first formulation) that the judgments in Geometry are 
1.) 3.) 
a priori and synthetic. This later tb rmulation is 
found reenforcing every paragraph of Sec. 15 of the Dis - 
2.) 
sertation except paragaplis A. and B. 
Vai anger, . 6- 75, dea with e development y 
Kant of the difference between "synthetic" and 
"analytic" judgments. In 1770 for the first time 
Kant recognized that the judgments in Geometry are 
synthetic and a priori. Vaihin.ger T. p.. 274. ":In den 
Grundsaetzen der Geometrie, in der Construction der 
Postulate, in allen Beweisen ist es Anschauung, welche 
die Mathem. Saetze vermittelt, nicht begriffliche 
Analyse. Nun war es aber auf Anschauung beruht, so 
ist sie --- empirisch. Somit wird die Endeekung 
ergaenzt durch den Nachweis, dass die Anschauung, 
welche der Mathem, zu Grunde liegt, eine reine, d. h. 
apriorische sei." 
2.) Inaugural Dissertation, 1770. Meiner, Bd. 46 b; 
Handyside, pp. 59 -66. 
3.) See above, p. 4, footnote 3. 
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The results of Kant's thinking in 1769, up to his 
earliest consideration of the concept of space as a 
concept of the understanding, coincide roughly with Diss. 
1.) 
15. D., with the important difference that in 15. D. 
the evidence which Kant gave to show that space is 
neither a substance nor a relation is supported by the 
nature of truth in Geometry. At the close of his study 
of Clarke and Leibniz, Kant saw that space is neither an 
absolute reality, nor a relation between real objects. 
He got his conclusion from that study. It is compatible, 
on the one hand, with Clarke's view that the world is 
neither necessarily finite nor infinite, and, on the other, 
with Leibniz's view that the can be no space beyond 
the world, that is, beyond particular bodies. What, then, 
is the nature of the concept of space? Kant's next step 
2.) 
was taken from Euler's attack upon Leibnizian space. 
1.) An adequate understanding of my discussion from this 
point on requires a constant reference to the 
Inaugural Dissertation, Sec. 15. 
2.) Op. Cit. 
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1.) 
Euler, in his paper, was defending the concept 
2.) 
of an absolute real space. In Sections X.IV. and 
there was, however, a significant difference from the main 
body of his proof. Whereas, in the main body, he fell back 
upon the principles in Mechanics as evidence for the nature 
of space; here he took the offensive against Leibniz 
in regard to the manner in which the m ncept of space is 
reached or obtained. In Sec. XIV, Euler showed Kant 
three facts. First, general concepts are not derived 
from the senses. 
"Il est vrai que les sens ne sont pas capables 
de nous fournir les idées abstraites, semblables 
aux idees des genres & des espèces, qui n'existent 
que dans notre entendement, & auxquelles il ne 
repond aucun objet réel." 
Second, the way in which the concept of space is reached 
is different from the way that general concepts are 
reached. 
" - -- la manière, dont on parvient á l'idée de 
l'espace & du lieu, est bien differente de celle, 
dont nous nous formons les idées des genres & 
des espèces." 
Third, it is wrong to claim that only those things exist, 
1.) Essai sur l'Espace et le Temps. 
2.) my references to Euler and to Kant's Dissertation 
must not be confused with each. other. Only the 
references to Euler are to sections in Roman 
numerals. 
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the concepts of which are obtained through reflection. 
"Et on se tromperoit fort, si l'on vouloit soutenir, 
qu'il n'existe pas des choses, dont nous n'avons 
d'autres idées que par réflexion. 
It is obvious from the analysis of this argument that 
Euler had in mind two ways in which a concept can be 
obtained, (a) from the senses; (b) through reflection. He 
was certain that the concept of space is not obtained in the way 
a general concept such as that of "extension" or of "man" 
is obtained. He was certain that a general concept 
such as that of "existence" or of "man" is not obtained 
from the senses. He did not maintain that the concept 
of space is obtained from the senses. How is it obtained, 
if neither through reflection, nor from the senses? In 
Sec. XV., he continued his argument. 
The concept of extension is formed by taking away 
from the idea (concept) of a body all of the determinations 
except that of the extended. 
"C'est ainsi que nous nous formons l'idée de 
l'étendue en général, en retranchant des idées 
des corps toutes les determinations, hormis 
l' étendue." 
But - -- he went on to say -.-- the concept of place (Whose 
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nature he treats parallel to that of space) which a 
body occupies, is obtained quite differently. It is 
gained not by taking away determinations from a body, 
but by taking away the body itself with all of its de- 
terminations. Place (and space) remain after this has 
been done, and therefore they can not be determinations. 
"Mais l'idée du lieu qu'un corps occupe, ne se 
forme pas en retranchant quelques determinations 
du corps; elle resulte en ôtant le corps tout 
entier; de serte ae le lieu n'ait pas été une 
determination da corps, puisqu'il reste encore, 
aprés avoir enleve le corps tout entier avec 
toutes ses qualités." 
He concluded with the statement that the place (space) 
which a body occupies is quite different from the 
extension, which belongs to the body, and passes with 
it from place to place; whereas, place and space are 
immoveable. 
"--- l'étendue apartient au corps, & pass avec 
lui par le mouvement d'un lieu á l'autre; 
au lieu que le lieu & l'espace ne sont susceptibles 
d'aucun mouvement. 
From this section of Euler's paper Kant formulated 
the following questions, not about absolute space, but 
about space as a concept, a concept of the understanding. 
(1). Is the concept of space abstracted from sense? 
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(2) . Does it include particular spaces under i t as a 
general concept includes particulars? (3) . How is the 
concept of "space in general ", related to tle concept of 
a particular space? (4) . How is the concept cf space 
related to an object in it? (5) . How do these relations 
differ fran the usual relation of a general concept such 
as "man" or "extension" to a particular such as "Peter" 
or "the extended "? Kant stated first his purely negative 
argument that the concept of space is not abstracted from 
1.) 
sense. It is presupposed by the objects of sense 
which it contains. He then turned to the further questions, 
the answers to which showed him that the concept of space 
2.) 
is a singular representation; ard more definitely, a 
3.) 4.) 
pure intuition and foam of intuition. 
The discovery that the concept ar space is a s ingula r 
representation, and a puis intuition, was made by contrast- 
ing it with general concepts. What is the nature of this 
contrast? First , th ere is "space in general." What is the 
nature of "space in general "? Is it like other gaieral 
1.) Diss. 15 A. For an analysis cf this section and dis- 
cussion of its relation to the esthe tic see below 
pp. 60 -68. 
2.) Diss. 15. B. Kemp Smith, p. 81. "Representation 
(Vorstellung) Kant employs in the widest pos Bible riD an- 
ing. It covers any and every cognitive state." 
3.) Diss. 15. C. 
4.) Diss. 15. C. and E. 
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concepts? Or is it different? Second, there is "this 
particular given space ". Is "this partiaïar given space" 
like other logical particulars? Third, there is "a 
particular thing in a particular space ". What is "a 
particular thing in space" in terms of Kant's new doctrir. ? 
What is the logical significance of the phrase "in space "? 
What sort of relation does it indicate? It was the attenpt 
to relate these concepts logically that led to Kant's 
development of his doctrine of the ideality of space beyond 
the point where space is a concept of the understanding. 
Euler showed him how the relations between space and a 
particular space, between a particular space and the object 
in it, differ from the relation of any general concept, 
such as "man" or "extension ", and a particular, such as 
a particular man or extended object. 
Take the general concept "man". It contains less 
than any individual man contains. Each individual man 
is more than the common denominator called "man ". Peter 
is not meant every time a man is referred b. On the 
other hand, "space" is not qualitatively less than "an 
individual space ". "An individual space" contains no 
does 
more space- quality than the general concept "space'. 
There are no characteristics of pa rtiaiia r spaces vh ich 
have to be abstracted from them in order to obtain the 
general concept of "space ". The only way that "this space" 
- - 2á- 
differs from "that" is that "this" is he re, and "that" 
there. That this space is here, means no more than that 
this space is this space. "Here" and "there" are not 
1.) 
qualities of space. They are space itself. Euler 
showed Kant that "space in general" is not related to 
every particular space as a general concept to a particular. 
It is not the relation of the general concept "extension" 
to the particular extended thing. Kant called the 
relation a singular relation of "space" to "this space." 
2.) 
Space is a singular concept or representation. In 
regard to its characteristics, "space in general" c on- 
tains no less than "this space" contains. Peter and Paul 
are both . men; but they do not contai n the same amount 
of "man". "This space" and "that space", however, have 
exactly the same amount of the character cif space. 
"This given space" has neither more nor le ss space - 
quality (that is, characteristic or c1ti ality of space) 
than "space in general". 
1.) See below pp. 91-92. 
2.) Diss. 15: Bo 
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"Space in general" seems no more to be given to the 
mind than "man in general ". Yet it is immediately known 
(that is, without the mediacy of abstracting Qualities). 
Because of the immediacy of this knowledge, "space in 
general" is given to the mind, whereas "man in general" is 
not. Knowledge of general concepts directly through their 
particulars is impossible. In the case of "man" and of 
"space" there are existing particulars. Peter, and Paul, 
or "this space" and "that space" are existing particulars. 
Exact conclusions about space are immediately or directly 
attainable. Knowledge about Peter is not ipso facto 
knowledge about "man ". But knowledge about a particular 
space is ipso facto knowledge about space. The immediacy 
of this knowledge means that "space in general" is given 
to the mind. Both particulars, Peter and "this space ", are 
so given. "Space in general" is given to the mind, but 
"man in general" is abstracted or derived. Truth about "space 
in general" is necessary truth, because it lies directly in 
the given concept. Truth about "man" is derivative truth, 
dependent upon qualities abstracted from particular men. 
"All men are mortal "; this truth is contingent upon the 
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number of individual men under observation. After millions 
of mortal men have been observed, an immortal man is not 
logically impossible. On the other hand, truth about space 
is a necessary truth. An immediate truth about "this space" 
can not be contradicted by truth about "any other particular 
space." Truth about the whole of space :)recedes truth about 
the given parts. Truth about space is not truth derived 
from qualities of "this space ". It ire given with "this 
space" or with space. The kind of concept that yields such 
a priori necessary truth is a singular representation or 
pure intuition. 
The example of a right hand and a corresponding left 
hand is no more significant than the example of "Peter" and 
"Paul ", except in one way. In both examples, when the two 
particulars are compared with two particular spaces, space 
is found to be a pure intuition. In either example, the 
comparison shows that "space in general" is given with "this 
particular space`', whereas "hand" or "man" is only derived. 
In either example, it is clear that knowledge of space is 
immediate in contrast to knowledge of "hand" or "man ". The 
example of a pair of hands is, however, different in one way. 
Whereas the contrast of "Peter" and "Paul ", or two extended 
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objects, or any other pair of particulars, with two particular 
spaces, shows that space is an intuition, the example of 
"a right hand" and its partner "a left hand" not only shows 
this, but also forces the mind to make or construct space, 
in its attempt to make clear the difference between the hands. 
In attempting to take a;- ;ay the object (hand) and all of its 
determinations, the determination of right (or left) handed- 
ness is unaccounted for without the intuition of space. 
1.) 
Unless space remains (as Euler said it did), the account of 
the nature of the two hands is incomplete. For this reason, 
Kant used in Diss. 15 C. the example of incongruent counter- 
parts to show specifically that space is a pure intuition, and 
formulated the more general argument in Diss. 15 B., where 
he showed that space is a singular representation, and in 
Diss. 15 D., which is mainly the critique of Clarke and 
Leibniz. As I have shown above, the consideration of space 
in contrast to any other general concepts is eyidence that 
space is a pure intuition, while the example of incongruent 
only 
counterparts has an advantage /because in it the mind is 
forced to construct space. This advantage, together 
1.) Euler Sec. &V.; see above p. 22 -23. 
- 29 - 
with the knowledge that the axioms and propositions in 
Geometry are a priori and synthetic, which Kant gained 
1. 
also in 1769, caused him to use only the examples in 
Geometry and the example of incongruous counterparts 
(which is, of course, also an example in Geometry) in the 
main proof (Diss. 15.C.) that space is a pure intuition. 
IIis own first formulation of that doctrine, after which he 
gained a more adequate insight into the nature of the 
axioms and propositions in Geometry, was the much wider 
procedure of setting the concept of space it to contrast wita any 
general concepts. 
Kant's selection of the example of incongruent counter- 
parts left him, however, open to one danger. If, in proving 
that space is a pure intuition, he required an example which 
forces the mind to construct space psychologically, he raised 
the question whether the doctrine of space as a pure intuition 
is a doctrine based upon the nature of space in contrast to 
general concepts, or whether that doctrine is an account of the 
activity of the mind (excited by sensation) in the construction 
of space. The doctrine, as Kant first developed it, is a 
denial of the activity of the mind either as abstracting from 
1.) See below p. 36. 
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1.) 2.) 3.) 
sensation or as a reflective process. But Euler 
had stated that the concept is reached in a way different 
from that in which general concepts are reached. And in the 
midst of the formulation of the doctrine that space is a 
pure intuition, Kant was already enough occupied with the 
question of how space is reached or constructed to base his 
proof upon the example of incongruent counterparts, which 
forces the mind to reach or construct space, in a special way, 
rather than upon the contrast between a pure intuition which is 
4.) 
contemplated and general concepts which are abstracted. 
Kant makes this departure from the more exact formula tion of 
his doctrine even more significantly at the end of the Corollary 
15 ., where, in spite cf his previous he 
raised the question, whether the concept of space is innate or 
acquired. There he held actiB Fly that it is acquired, and stated 
that an act of mind constructs it. Obviously, in regard to 
this view, the example of incongruent counterparts is of unique 
significance, since it forces the mind to make a construction. 
From Kant's stricter point of view, space is not constructed but 





Diss. 15. A. 
Diss. 15. B. 
See above p. 






he spoke of the contemplation of tin pure 
exactly, it would be the contemplation 
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fact of the 
and it was this view that tiras supported in 1769 -70 by the 
a priori synthetic nature of propo sitions in Geometry. 
As we shall see, this view was in line with his development 
1.) 
in the Aesthetic, while the view that the mind constructs 
space, (potentially the view in the example of incongruent 
counterparts, and expressly the view in the Corollary to 
Diss. 15.) became even more directly stated in the 2snalytic. 
Our present problem, hor- ever, is to trace Kant' s development 
of the view of space as a form of intuition, and his awaken - 
ing to the nature cf judgments in Mathematics. 
The first of Kant's logical problems had been solved. 
He found that the relation between space and "this part icula r 
space" is a singular relation. Space is a pure intuition. 
Truth about space is iven immediately with "this space". 
It is not knowledge gained by abstracting dualities from 
"this space ", as knowledge of "man" is rained by abstracting 
qualities from Peter. The unique nature of this truth is 
its a prioriLy. Truth about "man" gained by abstracting 
qualities frorn "Peter" is a posteriori. The distinction 
concerns a relation between concepts. Kant's problem of the 
relation of space to this particular space had been solved. 
.) A ,action of the jriti flue of Pure Reison. 
1.) 
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le rc aii_ed for him the problem of the relation of 
"this particular space" to "this particular object 
in it ". 
Kant's explanation of the relation of "this particular 
space" to "this particular object in it" came also directly 
from Euler. By means of the doctrine of space as a pure 
intuition, Kant had explained the relation of "space in 
general" to "this particular space ". In solving the second 
of his logical problems, he could speak of both "space in 
general" and "this particular space" as "space ", since they 
are the same. His second problem was the relation of space 
to the particular object in it. what is the nature of the 
relation expressed by the preposition "in "? It is not the 
relation of "extension" to "the extended ". An extended object 
is not in extension. extension is a quality abstracted 
from an extended object, just as "man" is abstracted from 
"Peter ". One planet has a certain length of extension, just 
as Peter has a certain amount of "man." Another planet has 
another amount of extension, just as Paul has another amount 
"man ". It is wrong to say that Peter is in "man "; it is 
equally wrong to say that a planet is in extension. The "in" 
relation is not one with space as a quality of an object (body). 
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If that were the case, space would be derived from the object 
by abstraction. The relation of space to an object in it 
is such that no comparing of similar marks or qualities in 
two objects yields space. All such marks or characteristics 
of objects are derived from the objects. Space can not be 
derived from an object. After a body and all of its qualities 
have been taken away, space is left. The space 
occupied by an object is quite different from the extension 
which is possessed by that body. The body carries its 
extension with it, when it moves. But it moves from one 
part of space to another. It remains in space, but it does 
1.) 
not carry space with it. Qualities or determinations are 
possessed by objects. A planet possesses heat, weight, or 
extension. Peter possesses colour, weight or "manness.v 
But space does not refer to an object as a content. A planet 
does not possess space as a quality or determination. It is 
in space. Space is its form. The relation expressed by the 
preposition "in" is the form- content relation. The form of an 
object is not capable of being abstracted from the object, 
but the object is in the form. The planet is in space. 
1.) Euler 1V: see above p. 23. 
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The planet, as a particular, and all general concepts 
(which are its determinations) are in the form.. Space is 
form of intuition. It precedes logically an object and 
all of its qualities. 
Kant had made two advances in his doctrine of the 
ideality of space. To explain the relation between space 
and a particular space, he had come to regard space as a 
Pure intuition. To explain the relation between space and 
a particular object in space, he had come to regard space 
as a form of intuition. Knowledge about a particular 
extended object is not a direct knowledge, or intuition. 
of extension. Knowledge of any general concept, such 
as "extension ", is gained only by abstracting qualities 
from particular objects. On the other hand, knowledge of 
a particular space is a direct knowledge of space. All of 
the qualities of space are in any particular space. Similarly, 
if all of the qualities be abstracted from an extended object, 
"extension ", as one of those qualities, is abstracted. But 
if all of the qualities be abstracted from an object in 
space, space remains. Space is a; form of intuition. 
In this first formulation of the doctrines of space, 
Kant was not concerned with specific problems about the 
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nature of judgments in Mathematics, either pure or 
applied. He reached these doctrines only in answer to the 
questions: (1) What is the logical relation between "space" and 
"a p articular space's? (2) What is the logical relation 
between "a particular space's and "an object in it "? These two 
questions were raised by the original position that space is a 
concept of the understanding. The only outside influence was 
Euler. He caused Kant to discover the singular relation, and 
the form- content relation. The singular relation between 
"space" and "a particular space" causes all truth about "this 
particular space" to be immediately truth about "space in 
general ". The form -content relation between space and an 
object in it causes all truth about the object to be conditioned 
by the nature of space. Both relations are in opposition 
as that 
to sty h relations/(Jetween extension and an extended object, or that 
between "man" and Peter. 
In working out the relations between space, the general 
concept; space, the particular concept; and the object in 
space , Kant realized that knowledge (in Geometry and Mechanics) 
is a priori and synthetic. Yet this knowledge is of the 
highest certainty. He realized that the certainty of this 
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knowledge is further evidence of the nature of space. 
Space is a pure intuition, not only because of its differences 
from other concepts, but also because of the certainty of truth 
in pure Geometry. Space is a f o zm of intuition, not only be- 
cause of its relation to an object in it, but also because cf 
the certainty of truth in applied Geometry. On the other hand, 
1.) 
a priori synthetic truth in Geometry is explained by the 
truth in 
nature of space. The nature of /Geometry is proof at the nature 
of space; the nature of space is an explanation cf the nature of t'utb 
in Geometry. With the full realization of this relation between 
Lure of truth in Geometry and his doctrines of space, Kant developed 
these doctrines in the Dissertation. 
The distinction between the doctrines of space as stated 
in the Li ssertation and the way in which Kant first formula ted 
2.) 
them in 1769 is cu er looked by Vaihinger. In spite of the 
accuracy of his account of the two problems (of pure 
and applied Mathematics) , Vaihinger f, ,ails to see that it was 
not in answer to those problems that Kant made his earliest 
formulation of the doctrines of space. Vaihinger's analysis 
of the doctrines in the Dissertation would be true of Kant's 
earlier thinking in 1769 only if, throughout that thinking, 
Kant had known that the judgments in Mathematics are a priori 
1. This line cf thought must not be confused with the 
critical problem of a priori synthetic judgments, 
with which 1;-ant was first concerned after 1770. 
2.) Vaihinger I. pp. 327 -334e 
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and synthetic. Vaihinger says, (II. 434.) 
"Die synthetisch- apriorische Natur der Urtheile 
der reinen Mathematik erforderte, dass der Raum 
als reine Anschauung gefasst werde (Diss. bec. 15, 
C.); dass derselbe auch als 'blosse Form' unserer 
Anschauung gelte, war durch die Natur der reinen 
Mathematik als solcher noch nicht nahe gelegt, 
sondern wurde erst durch die durchgaengige 
Gueltigkeit der anewand.ten Mathematik fuer 
alle Objecte gefordert (Diss. bec. 15. E.) ." 
This was true of the doctrines of space as a pure intui- 
tion and as a form of intuition, only after Kant gained 
the knowledge that truth in Geometry (pure and applied) 
is synthetic and a priori. Before he realized this, he 
found no more evidence that space is a pure intuition in 
the nature of Geometry, than in the nature of two such 
particulars as a pair of human hands, or, for that matter, 
in the nature of any group of particulars, such as Peter, 
1.) 
Paul, and John. As I have shown above , it is the 
contrast between space, as a particular, and other parti- 
culars, such as Peter and Paul, which showed Kant for the 
first time, that space is a pure intuition. In the example 
of a pair of hands, the mind is forced in a particular way 
to make an intuition of space. This is not the case with 
usual particulars. But the evidence that space is a pure 
intuition is just as certain by the contrast with Peter and 
1.) see above pp. 25 -28. 
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Paul, as by the contrast with a pair of hands or as in 
the nature of truth in Geometry. Either Kant discovered 
that truth of Geometry is a priori and synthetic before he 
knew that space is a pure intuition, or he discovered this 
after the formulation cf that doctrine. In the former case, 
his development would have proceeded quite differently from 
way 
the/ which I have described above. For the fact that 
truth in Mathematics is synthetic and a priori was of revolu- l.) 
tionary significance. 
fact If Kant had realized this /before he formulated his 
doctrine cf space as a pure intuition, the answer to the 
question of the possibility of such knowledge would have 
been more impor tant than a general consideration of the 
nature of space as a cone ept of the understanding. He 
would have included any treatment of the concept of space 
in a discussion of the problem cf a priori synthetic mathema- 
tical truth. Actually, he included the problem of the 
nature of truth in Mathematics in the section of the Disserta - 
2.) 
t ion which was devoted to the nature of space. 
In Diss. 15 A. and B., he ignored the problem of the 
1.) Vahinger, I. 269 -275; see above p. 19. 
2.) Di ss . 15. 
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nature of truth in Geometry. In part of Diss. 15. C., he 
treated examples in nature as well as in pure Geometry. 
In Diss. 15 D., he used the nature of truth in Geometry to 
refute Leibniz, but, otherwise, he did not consider that truth. 
Only in Diss. 15 E. was he exclusively concerned with truth 
in Mathematics, and even then he was corms erned only with its 
validity for nature. If Kant had begun in 1769 
with the insight that truths in úeometry are a priori and 
synthetic, why did he use that fact only to reenforce doctrines 
of space which were, in every case, formulated in answer to 
more general problems? Why did he use the problem of a priori 
synthetic truth in hathematics only as strong suppO ting evidence 
of doctrines whi ch exist witho' t that problem? The a nswer is 
that Kant's study of the Clarke Leibniz Controversy led to 
the ouestion of the nature of the concept of space, aryl not to 
that of the nature of truth in Mathematics. It is true that 
Kant had considered the problem of the nature of that truth 
1.) 
after the paper of 1768, but only in a general form. The 
specific problem concerning the synthetic a priori nature of 
that truth confronted him later. In 1769, as I have shown, 
he did not turn first to the problem at a ppi o ri synthetic 
1.) see above p. 2. 
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truth in Mathematics, in answer to which a doctrine of 
space would have to be worked out, but followed the problem 
of the nature of space closely. In the investigation of the 
nature of space as a concept of the understanding, he reached 
the doctrine of pure intuition, and the form of intuition. 
Then for the first time, he realized thé specific nature ctf` 
truth in Mathematics. 
Vaihinger's view must, therefore, be conditioned. He 
I.) 
says: 
"Dass also das Problem der angewandten Mathematik 
bei der Wendung von 1770 mitwirkte, kann keine 
Frage mehr sein, - -" 
If by the "change of 1770 ", Vaihinger means here the entire 
development â' the doe trines of space, as carried out by 
Kant in 1768 -70, he is correct in holding that the problem 
2.) 
of applied Mathematics assisted in that change. For 
it did, after the doctrines of space as a pure intuition, 
and a form of intuition had been formulated. If by the "change 
of 1770", Vaihinger means the change made by Kant in kts doc- 
trines of space upon his discovery that the jud« rents of 
Geometry and Mechanics are a priori and synthetic, he is 
correct. For upon that discovery, the already existing doc- 
1.) II. 435. 
2.) Vaihinger's view of the problem of pure Mathematics 
requires a parallel line of criticism. 
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trines of space were further developed in explanation of 
the nature of truth in pure and applied Mathematics. But if 
by the "change of 1770", Vaihinger means the change frcan the 
doctrine of space as an absolute reality to the doctrines of 
space as a pure intuition and a form of intuition, he i s quite 
wrong. For these doctrines were developed, as I have shown, 
apart frail specific problems concerning the nature of Mathematic 
After the development â' the doctrines of space independent cf 
the problems c the nature of truth in Mathematics, Kant 
realized for the first time that truth in that science 
is a priori and synthetic, end used his doctrines of space 
in explanation of this fact. . With the supper ting evidence 
of the nature of truth in Geometry and Mechanics, the doc- 
trines of space were developed in the Dissertation, as Vaihinger 
says. But Kant did not arrive at then first in answer to the 
problem of an a priori synthetic knowledge in those sciences. 
I have directed my criticism upon Vaihinger, beceuse I follow 
him in regard to the nature of the doctrines cf space in the 
Dissertation, after giant knew that they are established not 
only in their own right, but also with the support cf. the 
nature of truth in pure and applied Geometry. 
1.) 2.) 
Riehl and Fischer hold that the main doctrine 
1.) Riehl: I. p. 339. 
2.) K. Fischer: Eng. Trans. pp. 30 -31. 
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in the paper of 1768 was the view that space is an intuition. 
It is obvious from Kant's use in 1770 af- the example of in- 
congruent counterparts that, properly interpreted, this 
example is a basis for the doctrine that space is an intuition. 
But it i s my view, in agreement with 'vai hinger and Kemp 
Smith, that in 1768 Kant's chief concern was to sh.otr that 
space is an absolute reality. In 1768, the fact that absolute 
2.) 
space is "not an object of outer sensation," meant only 
that space is an absolute reality, in spite at' the fact that 
it is not an object of sensation. Far fran attaching signi- 
ficance to the fact that space is not an object cf sensation, 
3.) 
but possesses a reality "intuitable to inner sense", 
Kant merely noted this as a difficulty in the doctrine that 
it is an absolute reality. Until the doctrine of space as an 
absolute reality lead been rejected in 1769 , he found no signi- 
ficance in the fact that space is intuitable. Perhaps the 
doctrines are not incompatible, but this did not occur to Kant 
4) 
in 1768, if it ever did.. In 1769, after he had discovered 
the inadenuacy of Clarke' s and Leibniz s points of view, Kant 
realiz ed that space is a pure intuition, as I have tried 
above to indicate. 
We can turn now t o Kant' s development of his doe trines 
of space as a pure intuition, and. as a foam of intuition, with 
1.) See above p. 1; Vaihinger, II. 525; Kemp Smith, p. 163. 
2.) Handyside, p. 28. 
3.) Ibid. 
a.) raihin.3er, II. 310. 
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the supporting evidence of the nature of truth in Geometry. Kant 
discovered that truths in Geometry are a priori rather than 
a posteriori, and synthetic rather than analytic. what are the 
meanings of these distinctions? In accord with my above criticism 
of Vaihinger, we must be careful not to treat these distinctions 
as containing a fixed meaning for Kant before his investigation of 
the nature of space. He did not recognize before 1769 that truth 
in Geometry and Mechanics is either synthetic or analytic, a priori 
or a posteriori and set out to discover which it is. The opposite 
was rather the case. His investigation of the nature of the con- 
cept of space proved to be so fruitful that he was forced to seek 
a terminology which would express the meaning of his results. His 
discovery that truth in Geometry and Mechanics is a priori and 
synthetic was not the light of 1769. It was three steps removed 
from that light. His first step was to investigate the concept of 
space as a concept of the understanding. His second step was the 
discovery that space is a pure intuition and a pure form of intui- 
tion. His third step was the realization that these doctrines are 
of particular significance in reference to the nature of truth in 
Geometry and hrlechanics. The culmination of these advances was his 
description of truth in these sciences as a priori and synthetic. 
The difference between "a priority" and "a posteriority" is 
a difference between two types of validity or truth. Truth flow- 
ing from the concept "man" is analytic. It is based upon the 
nature of particular men. Such truth is limited to the extent of 
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experience. Truth flowing, on the other hand, from the concept 
"space" is a priori carrying with it a complete necessity and 
1.) 
general validity. Truth in Geometry and I. echanics is the 
clearest example of this sort. The difference between analysis 
and synthesis is a difference between two types of mental activ- 
2.) 
ity. The universal "man" is related to the particulars 
"Peter" and "Paul" by a comparison of narks or characteristics. 
The universal is contained, at least implicitly, in (that is, 
under) the concept "man ". The universal "space" is related, how- 
ever, to a particular in a different way. "This space" is space. 
3.) 4.) 
Whether space is constructed or contemplated by the mind, 
it is not obtained by analysis. In the first case, it is synthetic 
because it is obtained by a procedure which is the direct opposite 
of analysis. In the second case , it is synthetic only in the 
negative, neutral sense that it is not the result of any activity 
of the mind, and is, therefore, non -analytic. 
This was Kant's discovery in 1769 that mathematical truth 
is a priori and synthetic. How is such truth possible? His 
original doctrine of space as a pure intuition warranted this 
question in regard to all truths about space, no less than in re- 
gard to those more specifically accurate ones about it, which 
1.) B. p. 4. " Notwendigkeit and strenge Allgemeinheit sind also 
sichere Kennzeichen einer Erkenntnis a priori, and gehoeren 
unzutrennlich zueinander." The problem whether a priority in- 
volves a subjective necessity or a necessity for objects is 
considered below pp. 68 -81. 
2.) Vaihinger, I. 269 -275, see above p. 19n. Vaihinger claims 
that the distinction between analytic and synthetic jui gments 
was originally the same for Kant as the distinction between 
logical and real judgments, that in 1768 -70 a difference be- 
tween these distinctions emerged, which was lost again later. 
(I. p. 332 n.) 
3.) Diss. 15 cor. (end.) and the example of incongruent counterparts 
4.) Rest of Diss. 15. 
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such men as Euclid and Newton had formulated. In 11769, Kant 
ended, however, his investigation of the core ept of space, and 
turned his attention to the nature of truth in Geometry and 
Mechanics. Such truth is a priori because it is not limited 
to the number of particulars observed in experience. Truth in 
Geometry about triangle ABC is a priori, because it is ipso facto 
truth about any triangle. Truth in Mecha nics is similar. Judg- 
ments in Geometry and Mechanics are, furthermore, synthetic. They 
do not concern a particular object, such as "gold. ", whas e concept 
is contained under a general concept "metal". The concept in the 
logical predicate is neither a gen :ral concept, such as "metal ", 
under which the logical subject is included, nor is it a specific 
quality, such as "yellow", of the logical subject. The logical 
subject and predicate independent of each other. Judgments 
in pure Geometry and Mechanics deal with space. The objects 
with which judgments in applied Geometry and Mechanics deal are 
in space. Space is a form of the intuition of those objects. 
That judgments in pure Geometry and Mechanics should, before 
experience, be true, and that judgments in applied Geometry and 
Mechanics should be true for the objects of rature, is explicable 
1.) 
only if space is a pure intuition, and a form of intuition. 
In :Di ss . 15. C., Kant used the nature of truth 
1 Va ihinger , II. 434 . 
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in Geometry as evidence of the doctrine of space 
as a pure intuition. He also used the example of in- 
congruent counterparts as specific evidence of the 
nature of propositions in Geometry. He also reversed 
1.) 
the procedure and set the doctrine of space as a 
form of intuition as the explanation of the validity 
of judgments in Geometry in respect to the objects of 
nature. Thus, in Diss. 15. we do not have the doctrines 
of space as Kant first developed them in 1769, but a 
more thorough statement of them designed especially 
to explain the nature of the truth of propositions in 
Geometry and Mechanics, both as true propositions, and 
as true propositions in respect to the objects of 
nature. Such an explanation was necessary in view 
of the discovery that these truths are synthetic and 
a-riori. This discovery was made after the earlier 
treatment of the concept of space as a concept of the 
understanding. 
1.) In Diss. 15. C. and lb. h. 
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In the first paragraph of the Corollary to Diss. 
15., Kant developed his doctrine of space as a pure intui- 
tion more explicitly. He said that the relation between 
the parts cf space and space is different from the usual 
part -whole relation. In the latter relation, the parts 
contain the ground for the possibility of the whole. 
Peter, for example, is tall; but Peul is shcr t. The char- 
acteristic "tallness" is a constituent part cf Peter. 
Peter is determined by that constituent part. He is like- 
wise determined by all other constituent parts . They are 
necessary to the existence cf Peter. They make Peter 
what he is. They precede Peter, not tempcFr ally, but in 
the sense of containing the c ondi tions under which Peter 
is Peter. In -tni s type of relat ion, the constituent part 
"tallness" precedes- the whole "Peter" and is the ground 
for its possibility. The parts precede the whole. 
This -- said Kant -- is not the sort cf part -whole rela- 
tion of various spaces to space. Particular spaces are 
not (in the strict sense of the word) parts of the whole, 
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1.) 
but merely limits in the whole. They are not 
parts in the whole as the constituent part, "tallness" 
is a part of Peter. There is no such thing as a long 
space or a short space, as there is a tall or a short 
man. "Length" or "shortness" refer to things in space; 
not to space. The '7thisness" and "thatness" ar parti- 
2.) 
cular spaces are not qualities of space. Space is 
an infinite given whole. Only if infinite space be 
3.) 
given can any particular space be marked out in it. 
In the last paragraph of the Corollary to Liss. 15., 
Kant raised a Question independently of the doctrines 
of space as a pure intuition, and as a form of intuition: 
1.) Diss. 15. C.n. 
2.) See above pp. 25 -27. 
3.) Diss. 15 cor. First paragraph: " - -- in quibus, 
non sicut leges rationis praecipiunt, partes et 
potissimum simplices continent rationem possibilitatis 
compositi, sed, secundum exemplar intuitus sensitivi, 
infinitum continet rationem partis cujusque cogitabilis 
ac tandem simplicis s. potin s termini. Nam nonnisi 
dato infinito tam spatio, quam tempore, spatium et 
tempus quodlibet definitum limitando est assignabile, 
et tai punctum, quam momentum per se cogitari non 
possunt, sed non concipiuntur, nisi in dato jam 
spatio et tempore, tanquam horum termini." 
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namely, the question whether the concepts of space and 
time are innate or acquired. He admitted there that the 
question seems to have been answered already by his pre- 
vious arguments. The doctrine that space is a pure in- 
tuition, is, in its truest significance, a direct answer 
to that question. Kant had discovered, with the help of 
Euler, that the concept of space is neither abstracted 
from sense, nor gained by reflection. "This space" had 
been shown to be the same as "space". Space is inii diately 
known, and is a pure intuition. The a priori synthetic 
nature of truth in Geometry reenforces this fact. The 
whole of space precedes and determines the parts, which 
are limits in it. Infinite space is given, and conteniplated 
in Geometry. Yet, in the face of these doctrines, Kant 
raised the Question whether the concept of space is innate 
1.) 
or acquired. He answered this questi on by saying that 
1.) "Verum conceptus uterque procul dubio acquisitus est, 
non a sensu auidem objectorum, (sensatio enim materiam 
dat, non formam cognitionis humanae,) abstractus, sed 
ab ipsa mentis actione, secundum perpetuas leges sensa 
sua coordinante, quasi typus immutabilis ideoque 
intuitive cognoscendus." 
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space is acquired from the action cif the mind on the 
occasion of experience. There is an activity of the mind 
from which the concept of space arises. This is a different 
doctrine from the rest of Liss. 15. with the exception, pos- 
sibly, of the example of incongruent counterparts. These 
conflicting tendencies in Diss. 15. assume, as we shall see, 
greater proportions in the Critique. 
1.) 
Kant's doctrines of space in the Aes. are the out- 
come of his doctrine of space as a pure intuition as ex- 
pressed throughout Liss. 15. with the exception of the end 
of the Corollary, where he spoke of the activity of the mind, 
and with the possible exception or the example of incongruent 
counterparts in 15. C., if that example be interpreted as 
showing that space is actively constructed by the mind. 
1.) In my references to the Aesthetic, I shall use the 
abbreviation, Aes. Roman numerals refer to the 
numbered paragraphs under the heading "Von dem 
Raume". Unless the first ar second edition is 
specifically referred to, as A or B, the reference 
is to either. I shall refer to the Analytic 
as Ana. 
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In every other part of the Di ss. , space is -a . 
pure intuition. It is contemplated, and not con- 
structed. It is a presented or contemplated 
whole. In the Aesthetic, the example of incongruent 
counterparts is omitted. Its only significance in 
the Dissertation is from the point of view that the 
mind constructs space. In that example, the mind 
is forced to act or construct. It shows that there 
is an activity of the mind. But in the mid st cf the 
development of the doctrines of space as a contem- 
plated whole it is out of place, and presents a point 
of view alien to that doctrine. 
On the other hand, the opposite tendency of 
Kant's thought, which led to the position of parts 
1.) 
of the Analytic, was also expressed in the 
1.) The Ana. contains some portions rhich reflect 
the earlier view of the Aes. For example, 
B. 123. "Erscheinungen wuerden nichtsdestoweniger 
unserer Anschauung G-egenstaende darbieten, 
denn die Anschauung bedarf der Funktionen 
des Denkens auf keine 'Weise." 
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Dissertation. The doctrine that space is accuir ed 
from ah action of the mind, is ouite different fiom 
the doctrine that it is contemplated in the science of 
Geometry. Space is constructed by an activity aL' the 
mind. which is excited by outer sensation. space is deter- 
mined by that activity of mind. This is a different 
answer to Euler's auestìon. apace is not abstracted from 
the objects of sense, but it is abstracted. It is gained 
by the mind in a certain way. It is not presented or con - 
templated. Fran the second view in the Diss. grew the 
1.) 
doctrine in the Ana. that space is determined by a 
synthetic activity which begins with the manifold of sense. 
oe shall turn now to the developments of Kant' s doctrines 
of space after 1770. We shallnad trlaths developed the tvo 
doctrines of space more fully, but that he failed to make 
them compatible w i th each other. In the light of 
2.) 
their incompatibili ty, Ve shall find that he combined 
1.) A 162 -163; B 203 -204; see below- pp. 130 -131. 
2.) See below pp. 139 -141. 
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then in the Dissertation only on the assumption of a 
thoroughgoing dualism between sense and intelligence. 
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PART I I . 
In his original formulation in 1769 of the doc- 
trines of a pure intuition and a form of intuition, Kant 
was concerned solely with an analysis of the concept of 
space in contrast to the usual general concepts. Re- 
enforcing these doctrines in 1770 was the fact that there 
is a priori synthetic truth in Geometry and Mechanics. 
In nearly every portion of Diss. 15., Kant gave the doc- 
trines of space a greater significance than in his 
original formulation of them. Prior to sense -experience, 
the mind contemplates the whole of space in Geometry, 
and describes a priori and synthetically various relations 
in space. Space is not, therefore, a potential form, an 
unconscious mental endowment or tool, used by the mind 
in Geometry and Mechanics. If that were all that it is, 
then its difference from the usual general concepts, 
such as "man" or "extension ", would be overshadowed by 
its likeness to them. Both would be unconscious mental 
elements, or functions, used by the mind at various times 
in various ways. "Space" and "extension" would be 
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different types a logical elements, but both wou]d be 
logical elements, and nothing more. 
Such a doctrine was more in line with Kant's 
original argument in 1769. It is the only one which is 
1.) 
compatible with his most mature teaching in the Ana. 
But in Diss. 15. and in the Aes., he stated another 
doctrine. The whole of space is contemplated prior to 
sense -experience. Space is presented in its entirety 
a priori as genuinely as a colour is seen a posteriori* 
In pure Geometry and Mechanics, space, a conscious 
representation, is described. In piss. 15., this doc- 
trine is preponderant. In parts of the Aes., this 
doctrine is obscured (especially in the B. Edition) 
because of Kantt s attempt to separate his argumait into 
two different expositions. He set out to show in the 
Aes. by two independent arguments to at space is a 
contemplated infinite whole, with which the mind is con- 
cerned in Geometry and in sense-experience. In the first 
of these arguments, (called in Edition B., a metaphysical 
exposition) he proceeded with a so- called assumptionless 
2.) 
1.) See below pp. 131,133. 
2.) Kenn Smith 10. 9 2. 
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investigation of the representation cf space; in the 
second ( cal led in B. , a transcendental expositi on) he 
proceeded upon the assumption that there is a priori 
synthetic truth in Geometry, and used this fact as evidence 
for the nature of space. There is some likeness between 
these two procedures in the -es. , and the two stages in 
Kantt s thinking in 1769, but there is an important dif- 
ference. In 1769, Kant undertook an investigation of the 
concept of space, as a concept of the underst_nding, 
with no idea of where it would lead him. The one fact 
upon which he based his investigation was that space is 
neither absolute (as Clarke had claimed) , nor relative 
(as Leibniz had claimed) . The result was that his 
first doctrine of space in 1769 was a logical contrast, 
proving nothing more than that the ratuie of the con- 
cept of space failed to conform either to the nature of 
a particular, such as Peter or Paul, or to the nature 
of a general concept, such as "man ". In the -ties. the 
situation was quite different. His most important assump- 
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tion there was that space could be discovered to 
have a certain nature whether the search began with 
the representation of space, as such, or whether it 
began with the assumption that in Geometry there is 
a priori synthetic truth. On these two different 
assumptions emerge one and the same doctrine of space. 
Space is contemplated in Geometry (and prior to sense 
experience) as an infinite given whole, that is, a 
conscious representation. This was what he wanted 
to show by the two procedures in the Aes. His 
original search in 1769 into the ra ture of the concept 
of space was, therefore , only superficially like his 
metaphysical exposition aC space in the. Aes. In the 
former he had shown only that the concept of space is in 
a logical contrast with general concepts, while in the 
latter he showed that an assumptionless investigation of 
the representation of space leads us to the same infinite 
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whole of space which we km w to be the source of 
a priori synthetic truth in Geometry. In both the 
metaphysical and the transcendental expositions in 
the Aes. he showed that space is an infinite via ole , 
a pure intuition. In neither of them di& he show 
merely that the concept "space" is different from 
the concept "man" in the way that he had done 
originally in 1769. 
It is unjustifiable to strip Kant's arguments 
in Aes. of their obvious meaning, and try to read 
into them merely his original doctrines of space 
of 1769, which he had formulated before he realized 
that truth in Geometry and Mechanics is a priori and 
synthetic. These original doctrines of space remain, 
even if the arguments in the Aes. be rejected, as they 
must be in the light of the teaching of the Ana. 
The doctrine of an activity of the mind (formulated 
) 
in only two parts of the Diss . 15) turns out, in the 
2). 
end to be the seed out of which grew the doctrine 
of the Ana., which destroyed the Aes., and reduced 
Kant's doctrines of a pure intuition and a pure form 
of intuition nearer to the original significance of 
1769. We must follow out in detail Kant's teaching 
1 
1) . The example of incongruent counterparts and the 
end of the corollary. 
2) . See below, p..110,111. 
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in the Aes., and point out its relation to Diss. 15., 
before we follow _ his development of his doctrine of 
space in the Ana., and show its incompatibility with 
the Aes. 
To understand the first two arguments of the Aes. 
and to show their relation to the Diss., it is necessary 
to analyze Diss. 15. A. more closely. Kant has two 
arguments there. First, in order that the materials 
of sense may be put into an outer sensation, space, 
into which those materials may be arranged, must be there. 
Second, granted those materials to be arranged in space, 
it is they, and not space, which affect senses. These 
two arguments were designed to show the relation of space 
to outer sensation; but they do so by two different pro- 
cedures. In the first case, Kant raised the problem, how 
can the materials of sensation be got into a certain form' 
In the second case, he asked, does an analysis of them 
yield the form, once they are complete in that form? His 
answer to these two questions is: To get them into a 
certain form, space must be prior to them; in an analysis 
of them, space must remain :. ;hen they e abstracted. 
1 1). 
In the Latin original of Diss. A., and in the 
1) . Hartenstein , IiI . p. 143. 
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1). 
German translation there are three sentences; in the 
2). 
English there are four. The second sentence in all 
of these renderings gives what I have called above 
the first argument, that is, the argument that space is 
prior to outer sensation as the latter occurs. 
"For I cannot conceive anything as located 
outside me unless I represent it as in a space 
different from the space in which I myself am; 
nor can I conceive things as outside one another 
unless I arrange them in different parts of 
space." 
The first sentence of all these renderings, and áll 
of the sentences after the second, give what I have caned 
above. the second argument, that is, the argument that 
an analysis of a sensation as a psychological fact does 
not yield space. 
"The concept of space is not abstracted 
from outer sensation." - - - "Therefore the 
possibility of outer perceptions, as such, 
presupposes, and does not create the concept 
of space. Inasmuch as. moreover, things 
which are in space - - - affect the senses, 
space itself- - -Cannot be derived from the 
senses." 
In the middle of Diss . 15 A., Kant treated the problem 
of the relation of space to a sensation as the latter occurs, 
1) . : einer, Phil. -gib. 4613. p. 102. 
2). Handyside, p. 59. 
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or comes into being. the beginning and the end of 
that section, he was concerned with the problem of the 
analysis of a complete sensation that is, with the 
1. 
problem set for him by Euler. In this way, he 
formulated the two arguments. In each of them, he 
showed the relation of space to sense -experience. 
His arrangement of them suggests that the first 
is the proof of the second. 
In the first argument, Kant began with the assumption 
that an outer sensation is occurring, and set the problem: 
How is space related to this psychological process? In 
the second argument, he began with the assumption that an 
outer sensation in its entirety is there, and set the 
problem: How is space related to this psychological fact? 
The answers to both questions involve space, in the 
first case, as a framework, consciously contemplated 
inside of which a sensation may come into being; and, 
in the second case, as an essential ingredient aP a 
complete sensation. In the first problem, Kant considered 
under what conditions sensation occurs. In the act of 
1.) See abarre p. 22 . 
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conceiving (or arranging) a thing outside at me, or of 
conceiving (or arranging) one thing out side of another, 
I must first conceive space in which I am and in which the 
objects are. Space is prior to outer sensation. It is 
temporarily prior to my act at arranging objects in a 
certain way. I am conscious at the way in which objects 
are to be arranged before I can arrange them in that way. 
If I conceive an object to be outside of me, I find that, 
first, I must conceive space in which I am, and in which 
that object is. In the second. problem, Kant considered 
by what conditions a complete sensation with all cf its 
component parts is determined. In a complete sensation, 
things in space affect the senses. From such a sensation, 
things can be abstracted or carved out. Yet, after their 
removal, space remains. In the first case, space was there 
before sensation (and will be there after it) ; in the 
second, space is there apart from objects and their 
qualities, which may be abstracted. In the one case, 
sensation is a psychological oe currence; in the other, a 
psychological fact. In both cases, s ace is a conscious 
l.) 
representa tion_. 
1.) Compare A 20., B. 34. "Die Form (space) derselben (at 
appearances) aber muss zu ihnen insgesamt im Gemuete a priori 
bereitliegen, und daher abgesondert von aller Empfindung 
koennen betrachtet werden." Also _ 42., B 60. "Jene (space 
and time) koennen wir allein a priori, d. i. vor aller 
wirklichen Wahrnehmungen erkennen, und sie heisst darum reine 
Anschauung:" Kemp Smith loc.`oit. 
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Kant's arrangement of these two arguments is con- 
fusing. Needless to say, they are related to each other. 
Each shows in its own way that space is non- empirieal, 
not 
but one may /be regarded as the proof of the. other. Space 
is not prior to outer sensation because it remains if 
the objects and qualities of a completed sensation are 
abstracted. Abstracting from a complete sensation 
is not the same as the beginning or the end of that 
sensation. If space is prior to a sensation, it is also 
posterior to it. But neither its priority nor its 
posteriority involves the abstraction of objects and their 
qualities from sensation. In such an abstraction, a 
sensation is treated as complete, without reference to 
its coming into being or passing out of being. In both 
cases, sensation is psychological; but in the one, it 
is treated as it occurs, and in the other, as it is. 
It is unfortunate that Kant allowed the two problems 
to be mixed in Diss. 15. A., by stating one as the thesis 
and the other as the body of the argument. The priority 
of space to outer sensation is not evidence that space 
cannot be abstracted from sensation. rrobably- his adoption 
of the procedure of thesis and proof helped to hide this 
fact from him. 
The existence of the . two doctrines in Diss. 15. A. 
1 ) 
has been overlooked, however, by Kant's commentators. 
1). Vaihinger, II, 157, 160, 189 -5; Kemp Smith, 9:41;103-4; 
Baird, I p. 286 -288. 
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for a different reason. The obvious connection between 
Diss. 15 A. and Aes. I. , together with the fact that 
only the doctrine of the priority of space to sensation 
is in Aes. I., has led them to consider this argument 
as the only one in Diss. 15. A. They have overlooked 
the fact that the doctrine, in Aes. II., of the relative 
1.) 
necessity of space for outer appearance is the same 
as the doctrine, in Diss. 15. A., that space remains if an 
object and all of its qualities are abstracted. This 
relation between Aes. II. , and Diss. 15. A., becomes 
unmistakable when it is realized that the doctrine of the 
priority of space to sensation is not Kant's only argument 
in Diss. 15. A. Once this relation is noticed, it be- 
comes clear that the arguments of Aes. I., and Aes. II . 
unite to show the relation of space to our sense -experience 
in exactly the same way that the two arguments in piss. 15. 
A. unite to do so. 
It is not necessary to deal at length with the relation 
between piss. 15. A. and Aes. I. In tes. I., Kant restated 
1.) Vaihinger, II. pp. 193 -194. The doctrine of the 
absolute necessity of space is different. See below, 
pp. 74-76. 
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the problem of the relation of space to a sensation as the 
latter comes into being. He dealt with it more adega ately 
1). 
there than in Diss. 15. A. The representation of space, 
he said, is prior to outer experience. In order that a 
thing may be represents l.as in a different part of space 
from that in which I am, or in order that one thing may be 
represented as outside of and next to another, the representa- 
tion of space must already be presupposed (schon zum Grunde 
2). 
liegen). This is a repetition of the first argument 
of Diss. lb. ., with one or two alterations of terminology. 
Kant introduced the phrase (schon zum Grunde liegen) to 
bring the doctrine into outward conformity with the doctrine 
which followed in Aes. H. Yet the problem involved is 
the same in 1781 as in 1770. How are the materials of 
sensation got into a certain form? What is the relation 
of the representation of space to a sensation as the latter 
1 . An alteration of terminology in the Aes. is the 
change from "concept" to "representation" which 
includes both concepts and intuitions. See above, 
p, 24n. 
2) . The phrase "zum Grunde liegen", is used in both Aes. I 
and II. It means in the first case, 'lying at the 
basis of outer experience as that experience comes 
into being, or occurs;' in the second ease, it means 
"lying at the basis of a complete analyzable outer 
appearance ." It includes both arguments of Diss. 15. A. 
It means, on the one hand,'"at the basis of my act of 
arranging objects in sensation;' and, on the other, 
"at the basis of all abstraction of objects from a 
complete. sensation." 
-66- 
comes into being? There is a complete conscious representa- 
tion of space which precedes the representation of object 
A as outside of me, or of object A as outside of object B. 
Of the three sentences in Aes. II., the first is a 
restatement of the thesis of Aes. I., and Diss. 15. A. 
Space is a necessary representation a priori which lies 
at the basis of all external intuitions. As Vaihinger 
1.) 
says, Kant meant in Aes. II by "representation a priori" 
what he meant in Aes. I., by "non- empirical concept." 
The second sentence in Aes. II contains the doctrine of the 
absolute necessity of space, which we í.a11 consider below. 
The last sentence repeats essentially the second argumei. t 
of Diss. 15. A. Granted the materials of sensation to be 
arranged in space, those materials affect the senses. 
ranted the complete sensation, space cannot be abstracted 
along with the object of sense. In the first argument 
of Diss. 15. and the argument of .4es . I., space is a 
prior existing framework in which a sensation in all of its 
aspects comes into being, or in which outer experience 
occurs. In the second argument of Diss. 15. ., and in 
this part of Aes. II., space is an essential ingredient 
of a complete sensation or of an outer appearance. Outer 
appearancß (things in space) affect the senses. An 
external appearance with all of its determinations may be 
abstracted. U5onz their removal space remains. In Aes* 
1.)- Vaihinger II. p. 197. 
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I., Kant said that space was there before outer 
experience (and will be there after it); in Aes. II., 
he said that it remains if the object and the Qualities 
be abstracted from a complete external appearance. He 
took over both arguments from piss. with 
alterations of terminology, but essentially the same 
meaning. In all three sections, space is a conscious 
representation. Throughout these arguments Kant was 
dealing with sense -experience, first, as an occurrence, 
and second, as a fact. 
Kant's argument in Aes. II., raises many problems 
independent of the question of its relation to the Diss. 
1.) 
and to Aes. I. Vaihinger's distinction between absolute 
and relative (subjective and objective) necessity aids us 
considerably to understand Kant's argument, but that 
distinction leads us into further difficulties. The 
precise meanings of these two types of necessity can be 
made clear only by analyzing Aes. II., further. 
"Der Raum ist eine notwendige Vorstellung 
a priori, die allen âusseren Anschauungen 
zum Grande leigt." 
A priority involves strict necessity and universal validity. 
This being so, the word "necessary" is superfluous in the 
above sentence. If "universal validity" means validity for 
1.) aV ihinger II, pp. 193 -195. 
2.) See above p. 44n. 
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2e) 
the intuiting subject, then the first clause of this 
sentence contains only the doctrine of the absolute 
necessity of space, and leaves the question open whether 
or not it is also necessary for objects. If "outer 
intuitions" involve necessarily objects (that is, outer 
appearances) , then the second clause contains the doctrine 
of the relative necessity of space. If "outer intuitions" 
do not involve necessarily objects, the second clause 
contains only the doctrine of the absolute necessity of 
space. The first sentence contains, we may say, the 
doctrine of absolute necessity in any case. It contains 
also the doctrine of the necessity of space for objects, 
if "general validity" means validity for objects, or if 
"outer intuitions" involve objects. Let us proceed to the 
second sentence. 
"Yan kann sich niemals eine Vorstellung 
davon machen, dass kein Raum sei, ob 
man sich gleich ganz wohl denken kann, 
dass keine Gegenstaende darin angetroffen 
werden." 
Our problems multiply upon a consideration of this sen- 
tence'. T:luch depends upon the meaning of the word "davon.". It 
can refer either to "outer intuitions ", or to '`space ", or it 
can be a filling -in word, of which there are many in German. 
If it refers to "outer intuitions ", the sentence reads as 
follows: 
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"One can never make a representation of outer 
intuitions (in such a way) that there is no 
space, although one can easily think that no 
objects are encountered in it." 
If outer intuitions involve necessarily objects, Kant was 
stating only the doctrine of the relative necessity of 
space. But this cannot be the case. In the last -Dart 
of the sentence, he referred to the possibility that no 
objects are encountered. Outer intuitions do not 
necessarily involve objects. If there are cases in which 
outer intuitions necessarily involve objects, space is 
necessarily at the basis of those objects ( outer appearances). 
This is the doctrine of relative necessity. In all outer 
intuitions, space is necessary, whether or not such 
intuitions ever encounter objects. 1e cannot intuite 
except in terms of space. Space is not at the basis of any 
and every cognitive state, but it is at the basis of any 
1). 
and every intuition. In showing the a priority of 
space, Kant claimed its absolute necessity for every 
intuition independent of its relative necessity for 
objects. he was not claiming that we are unable to 
think except in terms of space, but that we are unable 
1) . I omit the doctrine of outer ana inner intuition 
which is not essential to this argument. 
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to intuite except in terms of it. In some cognitive 
states, (that is, in conceptions), we do not think in 
terms of space. In others, (that is, in intuitions), 
we do. Kemp Smith is, therefore, wrong, when he says: 
(p. 103.) "The ground upon which the whole 
argument is made to rest is the merely brute 
fact (asserted by Kant) of our incäpädity 'to 
think except in terms of space." 
__c tual ly, the ground upon which the doctrine of the 
absolute necessity of space rests is our inability 
to intuite except in terms of space. By translating the 
word "davon", as referring to "outer intuitions", we 
see that ih both the first and second sentences of es. 
II., Kant stated the doctrine of the absolute necessity 
of space for intuitions, and the relative necessity of 
space for objects. 
By translating the word "davon" as referring to "space ", 
we find that literally the second sentence reads: 
"One can never make a representation of space 
(in such a way) that there is no space." 
By treating the word "davon" as a word which me. rely fills in, 
we find that the second sentence reads: 
"I_t is impossible to represent that there is 
no space." 
In any of these three cases, Kant meant something oter than 
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the doctrine of relative necessity. Nor did he mean that 
the representation of space is necessarily involved in 
all intuitions. He did not refer either to our representa- 
tions of objects, or to any special class of representations, 
such as intuitions. He turned his attention, in accord 
with his metaphysical method of exposition, to the 
representation of space, as such. Space carries with it 
the quality of necessity. I cannot think of space as absent. 
Space cannot be represented contingently. If I represent 
a tulip as red, redness is contingent upon my sight. Remove 
the tulip, or give me green glasses, and there is no red - 
1.) 
ness. On the other hand, space must be represented 
necessarily. It cannot be thought away. This is the doctrine 
of the absolute necessity ar space. 
We have now arrived at tiro interpretations of the doctrine 
of absolute necessity; the one depending upon the translation 
of the term "davon" as referring to "outer intuitions "; the 
other depending upon the translation of it as referring to 
"space ", or merely as a word which fills in. Which of these 
doctrines was Kant teaching in Aes. II.? Did he mean that 
space is necessary in all intuitive thinking, or that it 
is itself a necessary representation? The first of these 
'uler; above p. 23. 
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doctrines turns out to include the second, if they are 
interpreted exactly. Closely interpreted, the 
representation of space is one case of intuitive think- 
ing. According to the first interpretation of the doctrine 
of absolute necessity, space is involved in all intuitive 
thinking. According to the second interpretation of 
the doctrine, space is a necessary representation. In 
any representation of space, it is represented necessarily. 
Any representation of space is, hau ever , a case of intui- 
tive thinking. The necessity of space, as such, is 
hence one case of its necessity in intuitive thinking. 
These two types of necessity become even more closely 
identified in B. III. where any particular space is 
shoves to be "space ". This being so, the representation 
of space is not merely one case of intuitive thinking. 
All intuitive thinking is a representation of space. 
1.) 
This ultimate identifie t ion of space, the 
necessary ingredient in all intuitive thinking, with 
space, the pure intuition, depends upon the intuitive 
quality of space and not upon its a priority. Pending the 
establishment of the former, the representation of space 
may be considered as only one case of intuitive thinking. 
The representation of space and the representation of x 
1.) Compare Diss. 12; A. 20, B 34.; B. 376 -377. 
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intuited triangles are x -4- 1 cases of intuiting thinking. 
In the light of the teaching of B. III., these x -1- 1 cases 
remain, but the representations of the x triangles are each 
representations of space. The necessity of the representa- 
tion of space, as such, becomes identical with its necessity 
in all intuitive thinking. 
Taken in the light of Kant's arguments in Aes. II., 
the doctrine of the absolute necessity of space is 
out of place. `,without it, the argument in Aes. I., and 
the argument of relative necessity in Aes. II., unite, as 
they did in Diss. 15. A., to show that space is non- 
empirical. Considered, however, in a wider perspective, the 
doctrine of absolute necessity is important to Kant's 
teaching in the hes., and gives us an important clue to 
the difference between that teaching, and, on the one hand, 
the original doctrines in 1769 of space as a pure intuition 
and, on the other, the teaching of the Ana. If we take 
Kant at his own word at the beginning of the metaphysical 
exposition, he was carrying out an assumptionless investi- 
gation of the representation of space. If he had fol- 
lowed that procedure closely, and if we were not allowed 
to interpret anything in that exposition except in terms 
of that procedure, then Kemp Smith would be right, 
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and the doctrine of absolute necessity 7vould be based on 
Cant's blunt claim that we can not think except in terms 
)f space. If we remember, however, as I pointed out above, 
that there is a difference between the metaphysical exposition 
)f 1781 and the truly assumptionless investigation of the 
3oncept of space, such as Kant had undertaken in 1769, we 
;ain much light about the doctrine of the absolute necessity 
)f space. In the metaphysical exposition, Kant claimed to 
take an assumptionless investigation of the representation of 
apace, but actually he set out to follow one of two 
)rocedures, both of which were designed to lead to the doctrine 
)f space as a pure intuition, contemplated in its entirety 
)rior to sense -experience, for example, in Geometry and 
lechanics. In the metaphysical exposition, he made no 
reference to the fact that there is a priori synthetic truth 
.n Geometry, but throughout that exposition (no less than in 
;he transcendental exposition) he was referring to our thinking 
.n any case in which we contemplate the whole of space, for 
:xample, in Geometry, pure and applied. The \sum of these cases 
.s not all of our thinking, but it is all of our intuitive 
;hinking. In the doctrine of the absolute necessity of space, 
ie meant that in some of our thinking (in intuitions) we 
; ontemplate space; that is, we represent it as present. In such 
;pinking, we can not represent space as absent. ,;re can not 
think it away. This is true, whether or not in such thinking 
re are concerned with objects (outer appearances). In all of 
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our thinking, we do not contemplate space. The doctrine of 
absolute necessity refers only to all of our thinking in which 
we contemplate space (viz. intuition). 
There is a parallel between the role of space in 
Geometry, as an example of the doctrine of absolute necessity, 
and its role in sense -experience, which is the doctrine of 
relative necessity. In Geometry, space is contemplated, and 
is necessarily there, whether or not objects are contemplated. 
In sense -experience, outer objects are contemplated, and space 
is necessarily there at the basis of them. In Geometry and 
in sense -experience we cannot think except in terms of space. 
The mind can not follow out the axioms and propositions of 
Euclid without thinking in terms of space. The mind can 
not represent outer objects without thinking in terms of space. 
In Geometry and in other cases prior to sense -experience space 
lies in the mind as a complete conscious representation. 
Geometry is an example of a science in which it is contemplated. 
In this and other cases it is contemplated prior to sense - 
experience. KantTs earlier teaching (in 1769) was quite different 
from this, and his later teaching (in the Ana.) contradicts it. 
The problem of the relation of the doctrine of absolute 
necessity to the doctrine of relative necessity raises many 
difficulties. Did Kant mean by the doctrine of absolute 
necessity that space is a necessary representation (for example, 
in pure Geometry) whether or not objects are encountered in it, 
and, in some cases (for example, in applied Geometry)objects are 
- 76 - 
encountered in it? Did he mean that space is 
necessary in all intuitive thinking and that objects are 
encountered in some of this intuitive thinking as in 
applied Geometry and experience) while in other intuitive 
thinking, (as in pure geometry) it is not? If Kant meant 
this, his argument in Aes. II. runs as follows: Space is 
a necessary representation. In some cases, objects are 
encountered in representing it. Space is, therefore, at 
the basis of objects. Stated differently, but with 
essentially the same meaning, his argument wu ald run as 
follows: Space is necessary for all intuitive thinking. 
Some intuitive thinking encounters objects. Space is, 
therefore, necessary for that intuitive thinking which en- 
counters objects, and it is at the basis of the objects. 
There is much evidence that Kant meant this in Aes. II. 
"A priority" means general validity, and this may mean, 
as we have seen, validity for objects. Also the term 
"outer intuitions" in the first sentence may refer to objects. 
Kant may mean in the second sentence that objects are en- 
countered in the representation of space, and hence space 
is at the basis of those objects. That is, in all intuitive 
thinking, space cannot be represented as absent whether or not 
an object is encountered (and, in some cases, objects are 
encountered). If the first two sentences are interpreted 
in this way, Kant included the doctrine of relative necessity 
within the doctrine of absolute necessity, and it is quite 
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justifiable that he should proceed in the last sentence 
to formulate the doctrine of relative necessity more exactly. 
"Er wird also die Bedingung der Moeglichkeit 
der Erscheinungen, und nicht als eine von 
ihnen abhaengende Bestimmungen angesehen, 
und ist eine Vorstellung a priori, die 
notwendigerweise auesseren Erscheinungen 
zum Grunde liegt." 
3.) 
The word "therefore" at the..:hegiñriirlg: of 
this sentence is further evidence that Kant was drawing 
the doctrine of relative necessity as a conclusion from 
the preceding argument. The conclusion is tlx: same as 
the premiss stated in the first sentence with the 
word "intuition" replaced by the word "appearances." 
1.) 
The term "appearances" is equivalent to cb jects. In 
the concluding sentence to Aes. II., Kant formulated both 
types of necessity. 
However unsatisfactory it may be, Ism forced to adopt 
another interpretation of Aes. H. Strictly stated, the 
doctrine of absolute necessity does not include the doctrine 
2.) 
of relative necessity and yield it as a corollary. The 
latter doctrine follows from the former only on the assumption 
that, in some bases, objects are encountered in the representa- 
tion cté space. The one follows fresn the other only on the 
1. I make no reference to the problem of the relation 
between "appearances" and ttob jects" . 
2.) Compare Vaihinger II, pp. 193 -194. 
3.) German: "also." 
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assumption that some intuitive thinking encounters objects. 
Strictly stated (as in the second sentence of AGs .II.), the 
doctrine of absolute necessity means that the representation 
of space is necessary whether or not objects are ever 
encountered in it. Space is necessary in all intuitive 
thinking, whether or not that thinking ever encounters objects. 
Perhaps it never does. In that case, the doctrine of relative 
necessity means that space underlies objects (outer appear- 
ances), and the doctrine of absolute necessity means that 
space is a necessary representation in spite of the fact that 
objects are never encountered in it. In that case, the 
doctrine of relative necessity means that space underlies 
objects (outer appearances), and the doctrine of absolute 
necessity means that space is necessary in all intuitive 
thinking in spite of the fact that objects are never encountered 
in such thinking. Perhaps the representation of space in 
pure Geometry is never a representation of objects in nature. 
Perhaps intuitive thinking in pure Geometry never involves 
the objects of nature. In any case -- says Kant in the 
second sentence in Aes. II. -- the representation of space 
is necessary. It is at the basis of all intuitive thinking. 
The doctrine of relative_necessity does not follow ipso facto 
from the doctrine of absolute necessity. To assume that the 
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former follows ipso facto from the latter is to assume that 
the subjective conditions of representations in general include 
the conditions of the representations of objects, This cannot 
1.) 
be assumed. Considered without reference either to the first 
or the third sentence of hes. II., the doctrine of absolute 
necessity is stated in this dray in the second: 
"--_ob man sich gleich ganz wohl denken kann, 
dass keine Gegenstaende darin angetroffen werden." 
In this clause Kant did not say that in some cases, objects 
are concerned. He meant that we can easily think that objects 
are never encountered in the representation of space. Further 
evidence for this view lies in the fact that Kant took over 
the doctrine of relative necessity from Dias. 15.A., whereas 
the doctrine of absolute necessity was not in the Diss. 
Further evidence lies in the fact that Kant treated pure and 
applied Geometry as separate, and did not maintain that the 
former includes the latter. 
I have mentioned the advantages accruing from the point 
of view that the doctrine of absolute necessity includes that 
of relative necessity as a corollary, and pointed out much 
evidence for this interpretation. I have proceeded to show 
why I think the opposite interpretation is correct. I do not 
claim that this interpretation is satisfactory in every 
respect. The word "hence" at the beginning of the last 
sentence is certainly evidence that Kant was arguing from 
1.) Compare Diss. 26, the first formula. 
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premiss to conclusion. In the second sentence there is, 
however, a doctrine of absolute necessity from which relative 
necessity cannot be derived. However unsatisfactory the 
conclusion may be, we must say that Kant put two independent 
arguments in Aes. II., only one of which came from the Diss. 
One result of this view of the doctrine of relative necessity 
as a second main argument, is that the connection of the 
argument with Diss. 15. A. assumes a greater importance. 
1.) 1.) 
Vaihinger and Kemp Smith are not justified in holding that 
there is no connection between pies. II. and the Diss. 
The problem of the relation of the doctrine of absolute 
necessity to the doctrine of relative necessity involves 
the problem of the relation of pure Geometry to applied 
Geometry, and of both of them to experience. Adickes says 
that in the completed theory of the ideality of space, there 
was but one problem for Kant namely, how is Mathematics 
possible? 
" -- -Man darf`._ also weder mit Paulsen behaupten, 
dass Kant nur das Problem der angewandten 
Mathematik eroertert, noch mit Fischer, dass es nur 
das Problem der reinen ist, noch mit Vaihinger, dass 
es beide sind (bald vermischt bald - - -von einander 
getrennt): man muss vielmehr sagen, dass Kant nur eire 
Problem kennt, die moeglichkeit der Mathematik 
ueberhaupt." (128 n.) 
1.) Vaihinger, II., p. 184 --185; Kemp Smith, 103 -104. 
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Je are not yet concerned with the role to which Kant 
relegated pure Geometry in the Ana. We have seen that 
in the Diss., he treated the two types of Geometry 
separately. In Aes. II., due to his metaphysical method of 
exposition, he made no reference to either type of Geometry. 
But his doctrines lead to important results in regard to the 
nature of the relation between the two types of that science. 
From the doctrine of absolute necessity it cannot be assumed 
that objects are necessarily involved in the representation 
of space. Similarly, from the nature of pure Geometry, it 
cannot be assumed that the objects in that science are ever 
objects in nature. To assume that judgments about intuited 
triangle ABC ever concern an empirical, intuited, three - 
cornered object, is to make the same mistake as to argue 
from the doctrine of absolute necessity to the doctrine of 
relative necessity. In both cases, the false assumption is 
made that the subjective conditions of representations in 
general include the objective conditions of representations 
of objects. If in Aes. II., Kant had argued from one type 
of necessity to the other, as Vaihinger says that he did, 
this would be ground for assuming with Adickes that Kant 
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identified pure and applied Geometry. But this is not the 
case. He put both types of necessity into Aes, II. He 
derived one of them from Diss. 15. A. He did not unify pure 
and applied Geometry. Perhaps the objects of nature never 
conform to the descriptions in pure Geometry. The doctrine 
of absolute necessity means, with reference to Geometry, 
that space is necessary in pure Geometry whether or not 
there is e. science of applied Geometry. Space is necessary 
to intuited triangle ABC whether or not that triangle ever 
coincides with an empirical, three -cornered object. 
Similarly, the doctrine of relative necessity means that 
space is necessarily at the basis of the objects of nature, 
whether or not there are only such objects in nature as those 
which are contingent upon the nature of our senses (as a 
tulip), or whether there are also objects in nature (as an 
empirical three- cornered object) which conform to the 
intuitions in pure Geometry. Because of the independence 
of the two types of necessity, we must assume that pure and 
1.) 
applied Geometry are different. 
Before proceeding to the discussion of Kant's arguments 
in Aes, A. IV., B. III., let as sum up the results of our 
I.) I have argued in a circular fashion here, claiming that 
the independence of pure and applied Geometry is evidence for 
the independence of the two types of necessity, and vice-versa.. 
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treatment of the first two arguments in the Aes. and their 
relation to Diss. 15. A. In all three sections, Kant 
formulated a psychological doctrine. Space is a conscious 
representation, prior to the coming into being of a sensation, 
and essential to a complete sensation. Space lies at the 
basis of external experiences, as they occur. It lies at the 
basis of external appearances, essential to them as they are. 
The representation of space is at the basis of external 
experience and external appearance!. These two arguments 
interlock with Je.ach other in Diss. lb.A., are taken over 
into the Aes., and interlock with each other there. They 
exist in this peculiar relation to each other in. the Aes., 
apart from the additional argument in Aes. II., that space is 
itself a necessary representation. The doctrine of absolute 
necessity is an addition to the two arguments of Aes. I., 
and II., which Kant took over from Diss. 15. A. It concerns 
our inability to intuite except in terms of space. The 
doctrine of the psychological priority of space to our sense 
experience (lies. 1. ), the doctrine of the absolute necessity, 
and the doctrine of the relative necessity of space for outer 
appearances (Aes. II.) are integral portions of the doctrine 
that space is a pure intuition. We shall see this isychological 
doctrine to be in contrast to Kant's later view in the Analytic. 
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I shall now proceed to the :-.ant's development in 
: =es. _. IV., B. III. of the doctrine of space as an 
intuition. He formed his argument from Diss. 15. B 
In 1770, he had used the contrast between "space" and 
general concepts to show that the former is a singular 
representation. In Aes. A. IV., B. III., he. 
however, 
used, /the same contrast to show that space is non - 
conceptual, that is, an intuition. In the first part 
of that section he repeated the argument of biss. 15 
B. Particular spaces are included in space, and not 
under space, as Peter and Paul are included under "man ". 
Iie made two changes in the argument of Diss. 15. B. He 
omitted the doctrine of the boundlessness of space. 
He made a contrast between the usual part -whole relation 
and the relation of the parts (or limits) of .space to 
1). 
the whole of space. 
that 
In biss. 15. B., he had said /particular spaces 
are parts of the same boundless space; hence, "this 
space" is in space, and not under it, as .Teter is under 
"man ". In A. IV., B. III., he stated the argument more 
exactly. He said that "this space" and "that space" are 
parts (limits) of the same space, whether or not it be 
1.) biss. 15. C.n, and 15 cor. (first paragraph). 
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boundless; hence, "this space" is in space, and not under 
it, as Peter is under "man ". Whether "space" be merely 
another particular space greater than "this space ", or 
whether it.be an infinite, boundless space, its relation 
to "this space" is not like the relation of "man ", to "'eter ". 
In either case, the relation involved is diffeit from 
the usual relation of general concept to particular. Kant 
did not raise the question whether space is infinite, or 
whether the concept of infinite space involves merely 
the possibility of a boundless progression in the intuitio :L. 
Whether space be boundless or not, -- he seid -- we can- 
not treat the concept "space" in the way that ?:e treat the 
concept "man" in relation to "Peter." This argument is 
negative, just as the argument in Diss. 15. B. from which 
it was derived. Kant merely said that space is not. 
,however, 
Kant developed/his point of view furthe=r in A. IV., 
B. III by taking over the argument from the first paragraph 
of the Corollary to Diss. 15. There he had contrasted 
the relation of particular spaces to space with the usual 
part -whole relation. He had found that infinite space 
is given, and determines all finite spaces. These are limits 
in it. In A. IV., B. III, he'repeated this argument with 
one modification. He treated the relation of the parts of 
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space to the whole, but he did not say whether the whole 
of space is infinite or not. The whole.of space is prior 
to the parts. The parts are limits in the whole. part is 
thought as "in" the whole. 
"Diese Teile koennen auch nicht vor dem 
einigen allbefassenden Raume gleichsam 
als dessen Bestandteile (daraus seine 
Zusammensetzung moeglich seil vorhergehen, 
sondern nur in ihm gedacht werden." 
Did Kant mean that the whole determines the parts? He did 
not say so explicitly. He did not say that the whole 
precedes the parts, _or that they are possible only through 
it. He said only that they are thought as in it; that they 
are limitations 'of it. In the light of the opening paragraph 
1). 
of Diss. 15. cor. his meaning is clear. There he claimed 
that the "whole" of space is the infinite given whole with 
the parts preceded and determined by it. In ses. h. IV. B. 
III, he omitted the question of the infinity of space, but he 
preserved in every other respect the doctrine of the opening 
paragraph of Diss. 15. cor. The parts of spi_ ce are de- 
termined by the whole. The parts of space are beside one 
another in space. The preposition "in" means the dependence 
of "the included" upon the "including ". The latter is the 
whole. He left undiscussed until the next section the 
1). See above, pp. 48 -49. 
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Question.of the infinity of the whole. 
The argument of A. IV., B. III. is the fruit of 
Kant's thinking of 1769. It is an integral step in the 
doctrine that space is a pure intuition. It is a step 
forward from his argument in ,Les. I. and II. In Äes.I. 
he had shown that space, a conscious representation, 
is prior to outer experience. In ties. II., he had shown 
that the same conscious representation is an essential 
ingredient of outer appearances. He showed in A. IV., B. III. 
that the same conscious representation is different in kind 
which 
both from the cualities and the general. concepts /make up the 
usual representations of objects. Space is different in 
kind from other conscious representations, such as "man" or 
"extension ". Space is intuitive; man is conceptual. Space, 
as an intuition, is an unconscious form, or logical function, 
but it is also a complete, conscious representation. ,_;pace 
and "man" are different, as logical entities, but also as 
two different kinds of conscious representations. Space, 
as a representation, determines every representation of 
particular spces. :Man, as a conscious representation, is 
determined by conscious representations of particular men. 
This doctrine loses its signifi-carce if either "space" or 
1). Vaihinger holds differently, II. p. 222. 
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"iman" be interpreted only as logical elements, as logical 
c ondit ions of consciousness , and not as conscious representa- 
tions. Kant gave is uc h a logical treatment originally in (and returned to it in the Ana.) 
1769/, but in Diss. 15. and the Aies. he treated space as 
contemplated in Geometry and prior to sense -experience. 
In A. IV. B., III, no less than in Aes. I., and II., he was 
stating the doctrine of a given whole of space. 
The difficulty with the doctrine of Aes. A. IV., 
B. III. lies in reference to the argument which follows in the 
1.) 
Analytic. Can the intuition of space be determined by an 
activity of the understanding, and also be a whole which deter- 
mines the parts? In A. IV., B. III. Kant developed the doctrine 
of the determining whole, and the determined parts -Tithout re- 
ference to an activity of the understanding. To summarize his 
2.) 
arguments in this section: (1). Space is a pure intuition 
because the relation of "this space" to "space" is not like 
that of "Peter" to "man". (2) . Space is a pure intuition, 
because the relation of "this space" to "space" is not a 
part-whole relation, in which the parts determine the whole, 
but the part -whole relation of determined parts m limits 
and determining whole. Whether space be represented as an 
3.) 
infinite (boundless) whole or as the pos sib ility of pro - 
4.) 
ceeding infinitely with the intuition, the relation 
1.) See below, pp.110 -171; Kemp Smith, pp. 94 -97. 
2.) I do not treat the last sentences of A. IV. , B. III. 
3.) Diss. 75 . B., and 15. cor. first paragraph. 
4.) Aes. A. V. after the first sentence. 
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of a particular space to "space" is neither the relation 
of a particular to a general concept, nor the relation of 
determining part to determined whole. It is the relation 
of determining whole and limits in that whole. 
In the first sentence of ales. ii. V., B. IV., Kant 
said that spáce is represented as an infinite given whole. 
This can be taken to mean either the contemplated or the 
conceived infinity of space. It can mean either that space 
is presented and contemplated as infinite, or that it is 
only thought as infinite. It is represented as infinite 
either immediately or mediately. In line with his arguments 
1). 2). 
in Diss. 15. C. and the first paragraph in Diss. 15. cor. 
Kant meant probably the presented or contemplated infinity 
of space. In the argument of ties . V. that follows the 
first sentence, he took, however, the other view. There 
v i e 
he said that the possibility of continuing without bounds 
in the progression leads to the princi }le of infinity. 
This is not the doctrine of a contemplated whole of space. 
A principle of infinity is not a contemplated or presented 
infinite whole. If we arrive at a principle of infinity, 
we merely conceive the whole of space. The argument of 
after the leading sentence, is the doctrine of the conceived 
1). "Intuitu, in ryuo contemplando scientia illa (namely, 
Ceometry) versatur." 
2;. See above, p. 49n. 
3). R.360. "Es kann uns kein quantum als infinitum gegeben 
sein, denn es wird nicht an sich selbst gegeben, sonlern 
nur durch den progressus, der niemals als infinitus gegeben 
ist. Aber ein progressus in infinitum kann gegeben sein; 
indefinitum, dessen Grenze90wir unbestimmt lassen." 
or thought infinity of space. Kant treated the infinity 
of space as a boundlessness in the progression. He said 
that a general concept of space can determine nothing in 
1). 
reference to size or quantity. Without boundlessness 
in the continuation of an intuition, there would he no 
concept of relations which would evolve a principle of 
infinity. In Diss. 15. B., he had contrasted the concept 
of space with the usual general concepts, such as "man" or 
"extension ", and assumed that space is boundless. In 
A. IV., B. III., he had made the same contrast without assuming 
either that space is boundless or the opposite. In r,es. A. V. 
he considered the nature of the boundlessness of space. In 
doing this, he showed that no general concept of space, 
such as a "foot ", or an "ell ", can be formed. One size is 
no more "space" than another larger (or smaller) size. No 
particular space is "space ", any more than any other par - 
which 
ticular space. There is always a larger space, /with egual 
justification may be considered "space ". This boundlessness 
is essential to the attainment of a principle of infinity. 
Without it no concept of the infinite whole of space can be 
formed, and we have this concept of such a whole. 
This argument is valid, but it contains two difficulties. 
In the first place, it does not show that space is non -con- 
ceptual. It is not a part of the doctrine of space as a pure 
l.) Also, R. 354. 
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intuition. In the second place, in so far as it shows 
that space is only a conceived or thought infinite whole, 
it not only does not show that space is non- conceptual, 
but it even shows that space is conceptual. If we arrive at 
a princi)le of infinity, we represent the whole of space 
1.) 
mediately. If the infinite whole of space is conceived, 
then `space" and "man" are similar and not different. 
In other words, the very argument which Fant used in A. V. 
to show that space is an infinite given whole, tórned 
out (es he saw after 1781) to show that it is conceived 
as infinite. It seemed to show that space is, after all, 
conceptual, with the parts determining the whole. The 
conclusions, furthermore, of the Analytic, with which Kant 
had been concerned were in harmony with this. According to 
his later teaching, a synthetic activity of the understand- 
ing determines space, making the parts of space prior to the 
whole, and the whole determined by the parts. This doctrine, 
which threatened to destroy the arguments of the ties., re- 
ceived support from the doctrine ií. A. V., of a )rinciy)le of 
infinity. 
For these reasons 1:ant recast his fourth argument on 
space in 1787. He italicized the word "given" in the leading 
2Y. wee below, pp.117421;B: 2 -3; Kemp Smith p.. 9i . 
a). The problem of the identification of mediacy with 
conception, and immediacy with intuition is a 
further question. 
-92- 
sentence to show that he was not referring to a conceived 
infinit He formulated a new argument which was designed 
primarily to show (parallel to B. III) that space is non- 
conceptual. To this extent, he was successful. His argument 
in B. IV., is an additional argument that space is non - 
conceptual. He wanted further, to show (even if in a 
negative way) that the whole of space is a given or con- 
templated infinite whole. In this he failed. His new 
argument is evidence that space is non -conceptual, but 
it is not evidence for the contemplated infinity of space. 
that 
In so for as space is infinite, this argument shows/ it is 
a conceived infinite whole. Kant tried, however, to show 
more. Space is an infinite given whole --he argued -- 
in the sense that an infinite number of representations are 
in it, and not under it. Each particular space is 
represented immediately. In this sense, space is represented 
immediately as an infinite whole. An infinite immediately 
represented whole is one which includes an. infinite number 
of immediately represented parts in it. Innumerable men exist 
under* the general concept "man ". There is, however, no 
general concept in which there are an infinite number of 
particulars, as an infinite number of particulars Lre in space. 
Kant used this argument parallel to the argument of :yes. B. 
III. It shows validly that space is non -conceptual, but 
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like . V. , it does not show that space is an 
immediately represented infinite whole. The 
number of representations in space is infinite, but 
neither space nor any of these representations can 
be treated as infinite without returning to the 
position of k. V. If space be infinite, it is 
represented mediately. Infinite space involves 
the possibility of continuing without bounds in the 
progression. Such infinity is conceived, and is 
evidence that space is conceptual. Similarly, if 
any one of the infinite number of representations 
in space be treated as boundless, it is represented 
mediately, which is evidence also that space is con- 
ceptual. In both A. V. and B. IV., Kant showed that we 
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have a conception of an infinite whole of space. 
We represent such a whole mediately. In A. V. he 
said that this conception is the result c an 
indefinite continuation in the progression of the 
intuition. In B. IV., he said that it is the result 
of an infinite number of particular representations 
in space. It is quite as invalid for him to assume 
an infinite contemplated whole in the latter case, 
as in the former. The number of representations 
in space is infinite, just as in A. V. The 
progression in the intuition is infinite. But 
each representation is finite. There is, in each case, 
a conception of the infinite whole a space. 
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Such a whole is not contemplated. In B. IV. 
Kant showed that space is intuitive. In this way 
B. IV. is an improvement upon r.. V. As an attempt 
to demonstrate the leading sentence, that space 
is an infinite contemplated whole, one argument 
is as unsatisfactory as the other. 
It will be remembered that in Kant's original 
treatment of the concept cif space in 1769 he faced 
two separate but parallel problems. In the first 
place, he asked, what is the relation of a particular 
space to space in general? In the second place, 
he asked. what is the relation of space to an object 
in i t? As a result cf his investigation 
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of the first Question, he discovered that space is a 
pure intuition; as a result of his investigation of the 
second, he found that space is a pure form of intuition. 
Upon his discovery that truth in Geometry and Mechanics is 
a priori and synthetic, he stated these two doctrines in 
Diss. 15., with this fact as supporting evidence. He 
stated the first doctrine in Diss. 15. C.; the second in 
1.) 
Diss. 15. E. In 1770 it was only in another section 
that he identified the pure intuition with the pure form of 
intuit ion. 
In the .?es. it was also outside cf the expositions of 
2.) 
space that he identified the pure intuition v:ith the 
pure form of intuition. His division of his argument into 
the two expositions had, however, a curious effect upon the 
relation of the two doctrines of space to each other. In 
each exposition he was determined (from different premisses) 
to derive his entire doctrine of space. This meant that 
following either the metaphysical or the transcendental 
method, he intended to establish both the doctrine that space 
is a pure intuition, and that it is a pure form csf intuition. 
The success of each of these irethods, as well as the unity 
l.) Diss. 12. 
2.) A. 20; B. 34-5. 
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of the structure of thought of which they form the two 
ingredients, depended, therefore , upon the validity of the 
identification of the two doctrines of space with each 
other. If the pure form of intuition is not also the pure 
intuition, it is quite possible that the assumptionless 
of space 
investigation of the representation /might lead to the one, 
and not to the other. The transcendental investigation 
might lead also to the one and not to tie other. These 
possibilities forced Kant, in identifying the pure form of 
intuition with the pure intuition, to make every characteris- 
tic of the one also a characteristic of the other. In the 
metaphysical exposition, he made no reference to the doc- 
trine of a fo na of intuition, yet he derived all of the 
characteristics cf the form of intuition and attributed 
them to the pure intuition. He claimed that 
space is a conscious representation prior to sense 
experience, and outer appearances. x pure intuition is, 
1.) 
by definition, a conscious representation. He dis- 
covered the pure intuition at the basis of experience and 
appearances. In 1769, in his original formulation of the 
doctrine of 'a- pure intuition he was not concerned with 
1.) B. 377. 
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the problem of the relation or space to an object in 
it. He considered this problem separately. He faced 
it with the doctrine of pure intuition complete, and 
found it to yield the quite different doctrine of 
space as a pure form of intuition. Due to his identifi- 
cation of the two doctrines of space, and his belief 
that both could be derived by the metaphysical method, 
he discovered prior to and at the basis or objects, 
not the form of intuition., but the intuition itself. 
Had he remembered his definition of an intuition, he 
1.) 
would have realized, as Erdmann says, that 
consciousness presupposes a synthesis of the sensuous 
2.) 
manifold, and that a claim that a conscious re- 
presentation is prior to and at the basis or sense - 
experience is a contradiction of that definition. A 
conscious representation cannot be prior to sense - 
experience, for, by definition, such a representation 
presupposes a synthesis of the objects of sense - 
1.) See Erdmann, footnote to n. 357. "Ich erwaehne nur, 
dass Kant das Recht, diese allgemeine Form als 
Anschauung zu bestimmen, gegen seine eigene Fassung 
der Anschauung als bewusster Vorstellung in Anspruch 
nimmt, da alles Bewusstsein Synthesis. des Mannig- 
faltigen voraussetzt." 
2.) As in Aes. I. and II. 
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experience, whi ch must be, therefore , prior to it. A con- 
scious representation ceríynot be at the basis c the objects 
of sense experience , f or, by definition, such a repro esenta- 
tion presupposes a synthesis, which begins with the objects 
of sense, which would require, in turn, another conscious 
representation at the basis of them, and so on, ad indefini- 
tum. In other words, Kant's identification of the pure 
intuition and the pure f orm of intuition, led him in the 
metaphysical exposition to ascribe properties of the latter 
to the f onrner . If he had realized that the only properties 
belonging genuinely to the former are qualities discoverable 
in the fonnal contrast of space and general concepts, he 
would have avoided the lire of argument in Aes. I and II, 
which we have just traced. Similarly, in Aes. B. IV., be 
used the problem of the relation ae space to an object -in -it 
not as evidence that space is a form of intuition, as he 
1.) 
had done in 1769, but that it is intuitive. This argu- 
ment breaks down, as we ha ve found, ,:Then it i s applied t o 
an infinite space. Even in reference to finite space, its 
validity depends upon the unquestiore d assumption that all 
1.) Kant's identification of these two doctrines explains 
his assumption in Conclusion b that space is the form 
of intuition. Kemp Smith pp. 114 -115. 
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representations are either intuitions or concepts. At it s 
full value, it proves only that space is non -conceptual. 
In 1769, Kant had maintained that the relation of space to 
an object in it shows that space is a form; in B. IV., he 
claimed that it shows that s race is intuitive. This change 
is 
in his argument /a further result of his identification of 
the pure intuition with the pure form of intuition. He did: 
not realize that this identification was ]wading him to an 
overstatement of the doctrine of space as a pure intuiti on. 
He tried to formulate throughout the metaphysical exposition 
the doctrine that a conscious representation of space is 
contemplated in its entirety prior to sense experience, that 
it is at the basis of outer appearances, and that it is in 
contrast to other representations, such as "man" or "extension." 
Whatever significance the doctrines of the Aes. retain, if 
interpreted as a tre_tment of the unconscious form of intui- 
tion, they contradict the doctrine eE the pure intuition in 
the Ana., which presupposes a synthetic activity of the 
understanding beginning with the manifold of sense. 
We have followed out the four argumen is in the Aes., 
which, taken as a unity, show that space is a pure intuition. 
In the light of these arguments, we may understand better 
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Kant's thinking in 1769 izhen he turned from his study 
of Clarke and Leibniz to the consideration of the nature 
of the concept of space. His original doctrine that 
space is a pure intuition limas the outcome of that study 
in 1769. He arrived at this doctrine without reference 
to the nature of truth in Geometry and Mechanics either 
as pure or applied sciences. He discovered later that 
truth in Geometry and Mechanics is synthetic and a priori, 
and, in the liss., he formulated the doctrine of space 
as a pure intuition with this fact as supporting evidence. 
After 1770 (more clearly in the 2nd Edition of the 
Critique than in the 1st) , he separated his arguments on 
space into those which deal directly wiüi the representa- 
tion of space (whether in Geometry or not) and these which 
presuppose the existence of a priori synthetic truth in 
Geometry. Both sets cf arguments show that space is a 
pure intuition, and a pure form of intuition. There is no 
reference in either to an activity cf the mind. pace 
is. a' pure intuition, "pure, because it 
is prior to sense -experience, and intuitive, because of 
differences existing between it and all general corn epts. 
In the four arguments in the metaphysical exposition of 
space as well as in the transcendental exposition in the 
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Aes., Kant treated space as a represent_ tion v.hi ch (for_ example, 
and 
in Geometry) is.,_ prior to sense -experience /is so<real as a 
1.) 
colour or a sound. Space is at tIB bast s of sense- 
experience, as a psychological occurrence. It is at the 
basis of an object of sense (outer appearance) as a psycholo- 
gical fact. It is a necessary representation. Its parts 
are preceded and determined by the whole. Its parts are in 
it, and not under it. These are Kant's arguments in the 
metaphysical exposition of space in the lies. He analyzed 
the representation of space, in relation to experience, and 
as treated in Geometry, whatev:.r be the nature of truth in 
that science. In the transcendental exposition of space, 
he used the nature of truth in that science as an explanation 
of the na ture of space. The relation of the two exposit ons 
to each other, as well as the nature of the individual argu- 
ments in the former exposition, shoff that, contrary to his 
earliest doctrine of pure intuition in 1769, and to his 
later teaching in the ' na . , he was concerned in the Aes. 
space 
with /aa:aconscious representation, 
1.) Kemp Smith, p. 92. 
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1.) 
I have shorn that Kant put two different views of 
space in the Dissertation. According to the first cf these, 
space is a pure intuition, contemplated in its entirety in 
Geometry. I have dealt with Kant' s development cat this 
doctrine after 1770 in the ...esthetic, and shown that through- 
out that section of the Critique, he formulated the view that 
space is a conscious representation prior to sense- experi- 
ence. We shall turn now to the second of the views in the 
Diss., namely, that space is abstracted from an activity 
of the mind. We shall study Kant's developmcn t of this view 
in the Analytic. We shall examine his unsuccessful attempt 
to combine it with the view cf the Aes. We shall discover 
how his teaching cf the Ana. destroys the arguments cf the 
Aes. In the light of his doctrines of space after 1770, 
we shall understand better the contrast between them as 
they appear in the Diss. 
The second view of space in the Diss. is contained in 
two parts of Sec. 15. In the middle of 15. C., Kant put 
the example of incongruent counterparts. Two equal but in- 
congruent hands (or triangles) are alike as far as internal 
arrangement is concerned, but they cannot be made to coin- 
cide. To explain their difference, the mini is forced to 
1.) See above pp. 51 -54. 
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make a pure intuition of space, and to locate the hands 
1.) 
(or triangles) in it. In this example, space is not 
presented or contemplated in Geometry, but constructed. 
The mind is constrained to act. There is an activity of 
the mind. This is neither an abstraction from the objects 
of sense, nor is it reflection. In this example, Kant 
returned to Euler' s quest ion: Is the concept of space 
abstracted from sense, or gained by reflection? Kant 
2.) 
repeated that it is ga irD d in neither way. But he did 
not say, as in other portions at' Diss. 15., that space is 
presented or contemplated, and not abstracted at all. 
There is an activity of the mind through which the concept 
is gained. He repeated this view more fully at the end 
of Diss. 15. cor. His answer there to Euler s question 
is similar to the example of incongruent counterparts. 
Space is neither abstracted frcan sense, nor is it innate. 
It is gained by abstraction from an activity of the mind. 
Sensation excites this activity, but it does not contribute 
to the intuition. Space is a product of the constructive 
l.) See above pp. 30 -32. 
2.) See above pp. 21 -24. 
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activity of the mind. 
In this doctrine, and in the example of incongruent 
counterparts, Kant was at variance w i th the rest of Diss. 
15. In the first argument crf Diss. 15. ., he stated that 
the concept of space is prior to me, and to objects a. and 
which I arrange outside of me, and outside or e&cia other. 
There is an activity of the mind, but space is not abstracted 
from it. Space is prior to that activity. In the second 
argument of Diss. 15. A., he had stated that space remains 
when the elements of a complete sensati®f, are ab- 
stracted. The concept of space is not acquired from an 
activity of the mind. In Diss. 15 . B., be had made a 
contrast between space and the usual general concepts, such 
as "man ", or "extension". He was not concerned with the . 
manner in which the concept of space is gained, or arrived 
at by the mind, but with the nature of space, whatever the 
way in which it is represented. He contrasted "space" and 
"man ", not; two types of activity of the mind. In Diss. 
15. C., he had said that space is contemplated. There is 
no activity of the mind. In Diss. 15. cor. (first paragraph) , 
he had said that space is an infinite given whole, with the 
parts determined by it. In spite of these doctrines in other 
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paragraphs of Diss. 15., Kant said, in concluding that section, 
that the concept of' space is abstracted from an action of 
mind. 
Can his other doctrines cf' space in Diss. 15. be re- 
a 
c one iled `:i th this view? vfhat is tip nature of such /mental 
activity? There are only three possible types cf mental 
activity from which space could be abstracted. The first type 
is a purely intellectual activity, having its origin apart 
from sense -experience, but yielding paradoxically a pure form 
of sense -experience, space. This is the view at the end of 
Diss. 15. cor. The second type is equally paradoxical, but in 
a different way. It has its origin neither in the intellect, 
nor in sense -experience. It yields space, as a pure intuition 
and a pure form of intuition, and begins apparently with 
1.) 
sensitive parts or limits in it. This doctrine is the 
result of Kant's misunderstanding after 1770 of the nature of 
2.) 
a synthetic activity of the mind. He failed at that time 
to realize that the only kind of activity which can yield 
space either as a pure intuition or as a pure form of intuition 
is an activity which begins with the objects csf sense (sensuous 
manifold) . He forgot that if there is a particular :pace with 
which/Mental activity could begin, then to reach the whole) 
1. Cf. Kant's distinction (Dins. 5 ) between the matter 
and form of sensation, the latter being sensitive. 
2.) See below pp.127-l3 esp. 
- 
p0.1 30 n. 
no such activity is necessary, for one particular space 
is ttspacett no less than a greater (or smaller) particular 
space. The third type of mental activity has its origin in 
sense -experience, from which it constructs space, as a pure 
intuition, and a pure font' of intuition. Space is deter- 
mined by an activity of the mind, which begins with the 
sensuous manifold. This is the view cf the hnalytic . It is 
in contradiction with the teaching cf Liss. 15. , and with 
the four arguments in the Aes. 
Can space be prior to sensation, and be derived from 
activity of the mind? If so, such an activity must be com- 
pletely intellectual, and must yield a sensitive whole, 
Can an activity of the mind yield the whole space without 
having dealt already with the parts? Can an activity cf the 
mind yield the whole cf space unless the parts precede and 
determine the whole? If so, the activity is completely 
intellectual, in spite of the fact that the whole of' space 
(including the parts) is entirely sensitive. The dualism 
of 1770 between sense and intelligence lies at the basis of 
Kant's reconciliation of the doctrine of the priority of 
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space to sense -experience with the doctrine of the activity 
of the mind from which space is abstracted. That dualism 
lies also at the basis of Kant' s reconciliation of the doe trine 
that the whole: of space precedes and deternim s the parts 
(limits) with the same doctrine of the activity of the mind. 
If that dualism be denied (as Kant denied it after 1770) then 
no activity of the mind can yield space unless that activity 
begin with the sensuous manifold, in which case sense- experi- 
ence precedes space. If conception and intuition are not 
isolated but connected, there cannot be an activity csf the 
understanding unless it begin with the sensuous manifold. 
Any activity which does not begin with sense -experience must be 
entirely intellectual , in which case , the dualism is re tained; 
or it must begin with parts of space, in which case, space is 
not abstracted from it, but is already given before the 
activity begins. For any particular space is "space" as much 
as any other. If the dualism csf 1770 be denied, then no 
activity of the mind can yield space unless that activity 
begin with sense -experience, in which case, the parts of space 
precede and determine the whole of space. If an activity 
of the understanding begin wi th the sensuous manifold, it can 
yield space only if space is not prior to but after that mani- 
fold. It can yield the whole cif space only after having dealt 
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first with the parts. It cannot deal with the parts 
first, nd then yield a whole which precedes and determines 
the parts. 
denial of the dualism of sense and intelligence, 
and the affirmation of a synthetic activity of the mind 
leads, therefore, to a direct contradiction d the teachings 
of the Aes. Space cannot be abstracted from an activity 
of the mind, and yet be prior to sense- experience. The 
whole of space cannot be abstracted from an activity of the 
mind, and yet precede the parts of space with which that 
activity has dealt. In the piss., due to his dualism, Kant 
did not face these facts. He assumed that a.n entirely intel- 
lectual activity can yield ten entirely sensitive whole, without 
the objects of sense being prior to space, and without 
that activity having dealt previously with the parts at 
space. Because of his dualism, he assumed that space is 
prior to the objects of sense; that the sensitive whole of 
space precedes and determines the parts; and that there is 
an activity of the mind from which space is abstracted. 
After 1770, he rejected the dualism between sense and 
intellect upon which this doctrine is based. We must now 
trace his rejection of the dualism and his folliula t ion of 
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a theory of knowledge in which intuition and conception 
are bound together. In the light of this theory of knowledge, 
we shall see more clearly how he contradicted the teachings 
of the .'Les. He retained them in the Oritique either because 
he did not realize that he had contradicted them, cm because, 
realizing it, he saw that the alteration required was too 
far -reaching to be undertaken. 
It will be noticed as my argument progresses frail 
this point that I differ in one respect frail Kemp Smith in 
regard to the nature of the conflicting doctrines of space 
in the Aes. and Ana. respectively. I agree with him that 
there are these conflicting doctrines. He goes on, however, 
to maintain that Kant was unaware of them. 
(p. 96.) "But Kant does not himself recognize any 
conflict between this teaching (of the Ana.) and 
the doctrine o e the Aesthetic." 
Now I do not maintain the opposite. I do not claim that 
Kant was aware of these contradictions. I do claim, however, 
disjunctively that Kant was either unaware of them, ar he 
was aware of them and realiz ed that t o at tempt a reconcila- 
tion meant the destruction of" the .n-es. In the former case, 
certain passages (as at B. 160n.) represent a genuine attempt 
on his. part to build up a unified doctrine á space in the 
Critique, and Kemp Smith is not justified in claiming 
1.) 
that giant grafted one view upon the other. Only in 
the latter case may Kant be said to have been grafting. 
If the differences between the Ana. and the Aes. are as 
important as I believe them to be, Kant would have grafted 
had 
the one upon the other only if he /recognized the conflict 
had 
and /realized that such grafting was the least unsatisfactory 
solution. If he did not recognize the conflict, he cannot 
be said to have been grafting. Let us consider his teaching 
in the Ana . 
(B. 146.) "Sich einen Gegenstand denken, und 
einen Gegenstand erkennen, ist also nicht einerlei. 
Zum Erkennt gehoeren naemlich zwei Stuecke: 
erstlich der Begriff, dadurch uberhaupt ein 
Gegenstand gedacht wird (die Kategorie) und 
zweitens die 1i.nschauung, dadurch er gegeben wird; 
denn, koennte dem. Begriffe eine korrespondierende 
Anschauung gar nicht gegeben werden, so waere 
er ein Gedanke der .eorm nach, aber ohne allen 
Gegenstand, und durch ihn keine Erkenntnis von 
irgendeinem Dinge moeglich;" 
Thought -- according to Kant after 1'770 -- is distin- 
guished from knowledge, and t1 latter is bound inseparably 
wi th intuition. It is possible to think an object without 
knowing one. There is knowledge only ..hen an intuition cf 
the object corresponds to a concept cf it. Only concepts .
are required for thinking, but both concepts and correspond- 
TT- Kemp Smith, loc. cit. 
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ing intuitions are required for knowledge. 
(B. 146.) "Sinnliche Anschauung ist entweder 
reine Anschauung (R. und Z.) oder empirische 
Anschauung desjenigen, was im Raum und der Zeit 
unmittelbar als. wirklich, durch ímpfindung, vorges- 
tellt wi rd . Durch Bestimmung der ersteren koennen 
wir Frkenntni sse a priori von Gegenstaenden (in 
der Mathematik) bekommen, aber nur ihrer Form 
nach, als Erscheinungen; ob es Dinge geben koenne, 
die in diese Form angeschaut werden muessen, 
bleibt doch dabei noch unausgemacht. Folglich 
sind alle mathematischen Begriffe fuer sich nicht 
Erkenntnisse;" 
Sensible intuitions are of two kinds: First', the pure 
intuitions of space and time (as in Diss. 15. C.) ; 
second, the intuitions of the objects in space time 
(as in Diss. 15. E.) . Concepts corresponding to pure 
intuition give knowledge in form. Knowledge in form differs 
concept 
from thinking which is' not knowledge in that its /corresponds 
to a pure intuition, and is not, therefore,merely a concept 
with no content. It differs from the knowledge of the 
objects in space and time in that its intuition is pure, 
and not empirical. It is knowledge in form. only. It does 
not tell us whether objects exist which could be intuited 
in such a form. The concepts of Mathematics do not give 
knowledge without a correa; onding intuition any more than 
any other concepts. An intuition oe objects in space is 
not, however, the only kind which can correspond to a con- 
cept of the mind. When a pure intuition corresponds to a 
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concept, there is knowledge in form only. When an 
empirical intuition corresponds to a concept, there is 
knowledge. 
(B. 147.) "Dinge im Raum und der Zeit werden 
aber nur gegeben, sofern sie Wahrnehmungen (mit 
n.pfindung begleitete Vorstellungen) sind, 
mithin durch empirische Vorstellung. Folglich 
verschaffen die reinen Verstandesbegriffe, selbst 
wenn sie auf Anschauungen a priori (wie in der 
Math.) angewandt werden, nur sofern Erkenntnis, 
als diese, mithin auch die Verstandesbegriffe 
vermittelst ihrer, auf empiriche Anschauungen 
angewandt werden koennen." 1 
A concept in Mathematics becomes knowledge either by being 
applied to an empirical intuition, that is, to an empirical 
2.) 
object in space, or by being applied a priori to an 
intuition (space or time) which could be applied to an 
empirical intuition. The latter is knwedge in form. 
Kant refers to three different kinds of application. 
There is, first, the straightforward application cf a con- 
cept to an empirical intuition. This mans that the object 
is thought and intuited, and that the concept and intuition 
correspond to give knowledge. There is, second, the 
application a priori of a concept to an intuition. This 
occurs in pure Mathematics. In this type of application, 
the object is not necessarily existent. There is an object 
1.) Compare, B. 194 -195. 
2.) The second way is the significant addition. 
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which is thought and intuited, but since this object is 
not intuited empirically, there is no assurance that it 
exists. This is knowledge in fo Ozu only. In both of these 
cases, the application depends upon a correspondence between 
a concept and an intuition. These two types of representa- 
tions correspond. The concept is applied to the intuition. 
The third kind of application is quite different. It is 
the application of a pure intuition (space or time) to an 
empirical intuition. It is based upon the relation cf a 
form of intuition to an empirical content. The pure 
intuition (space) is a form of every pas Bible empirical 
intuition. If a concept has been applied to a pure intuition 
which is a foam of every empirical intuition, it follows 
that the concept could be applied to any empirical intuition. 
If concept a has been applied to pure intuition b, and if 
pure intuition b could be applied to empirical intuition 
c, (since pure intuition b is a form of empirical intuition ) , 
then it follows that concert a could be applied (along with 
b) to c. Kant's statement of this doctrine is obscure, due 
to its inclusion in a clause (mithin auch die Verstandes- 
begriffe vermittelst ihrer) which breaks the train of thought. 
Yet it is vital to his argument. For only in the application 
- 115 - 
of a concept to an empirical intuition does knowledge 
occur. The significance of the doctrine is that it shows 
how we may, without gaining any knowledge (i.e., by means 
of knowledge in form) , ascertain the conditions of knowledge. 
Kant would seem, in a broad way, to argue thus: I am 
going to state a doctrine which, at first glance, will seem 
only to limit áll knowledge to experience, and to deny that 
pure Mathematics belongs to experience, and, therefore, to 
deny that in pure Mathematics there is knowledge. If you 
follow me closely, however , you will see that in this 
doctrine something more important emerges than this negative 
conclusion. In pure Mathematics, without turning to 
experience, I find a way of accurately limiting knowledge, 
and of setting up conditions which knowledge cannot contra- 
dict. I do, in fact, deny that in pure Mathematics there 
is knowledge; but I hold that there is in it knowledge in 
form. This is no merely negative conclusion, for it is by 
means of knowledge in form that we can determine the 
possibility (limiting conditions) of knowledge. The applica- 
tion of a concept to an empirical intuition gives knowledge. 
The application of a concept to a pure intuition (which may 
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be applied to an empirical intuition) sets conditions 
under which knowledge oc curs , and w h_ ch knowledge c ari no t 
contradict. Space is a pure intuition, and a pure form of 
empirical intuition. In the application of a concept to 
the pure intuition of space, there is not knowledge, but only 
knowledge in form. This knowledge in form determines tie 
conditions cf knowledge. This does not mean that any intui- 
tion, which is not empirical, can determine the conditions 
oL knowledge. There may be some intuition, i rhich is not 
given to man. Unless such an intuition were also a form of 
empirical intuitions, it would not determine the possibility 
of them. The pure intuitions of space and tine are not the 
source of knowledge, but they bear an important relation to 
it. They are intuitions to which concepts are applied, and 
1.) 
which are the form of all empirical intuit ions. The 
knowledge in form resulting from that application is a 
determination of the limits of knowledge. 
Kant's union, after 1770, of conception and intuition 
alters the doctrines of space as a pure intuition, and as a 
1.) The significance of the pure intuition of space in pure 
Geometry lies in its being at the same time the form of 
any possible empirical intuition. This makes Geometry 
a scie nce which determines the limite of knowledge, 
and makes the pure intuition of space significant in spite 
of the fact that it is an ens imaginarium. 
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form of intuition. Space cannot be represented except 
1.) 
by drawing it in the mind. The understanding can 
neither merely intuite space, nor merely conceive it. 
The understanding can neither merely intuite an object in 
space, nor merely conceive it. For a human understanding, 
there is neither space (and time) apart frcra the conditions 
of conception, nor categories (rules of conception) apart 
from intuition. Space is represented only on the occasion 
of the percertion of extended things. 
(B. 348 -9.) "Wenn das Licht nicht den Sinnen 
gegeben worden, so kann man sich keine Finsternis, 
und wenn nicht ausgedehnte Wesen wahrgenommen 
worden, keinen Raum vorstellen." 2.) 
representation, of space depends upon the sensuous 
manifold. It is with this manifold that the activity of 
the understanding begins. In pure and applied Geometry, 
the understanding has this common starting place. Without 
the sensuous manifold, there could be no pure intuition 
of space in pure Geometry, and no pure form of intuition 
of space in applied Geometry. The pure manifold at' space 
1.) (A 162 -3; B. 203 -4) "Ich kann mir keine Linie, so 
klein sie auch sei, vorstellen, ohne sie in Gedanken 
zu ziehen, d. i. von einem Punkte alle Teile nach und 
nach zu erzeugen, and dadurch alleerst diese Anschauung 
zu verzeichnen. Ebenso ist es mit jeder der kleinsten 
Zeit (and space) bewandt." 
2. )C.A. 196; B 241. 
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is represented in pure Geometry only in contrast to the 
sensuous manifold. The pure fame of the sensuous manifold 
is represented in applied Geometry only in contrast to its 
content, the sensuous manifold. Space without the sensuous 
1.) 
manifold is an ens imaginarium. Space is only the 
fain. for setting the objects cf sense together. If no 
objects are set together, nothing rema ins. 
(R. 985.) "Raum und Zeit sind selbst nichts 
anderes als Formen der Zusammensetzung der 
Objecte der anpfindung; daher auch, ,,penn man 
alle Zusammensetzung de aufhebt, nichts uebrig 
bleibt." 
Unless the synthetic activity of the understanding sets 
the objects of sense together, the is no space, either 
as a pure intuition, or as a form of intuition. In both 
pure and applied Geanetry, space is determined by that 
activity. This doc trine is an outgrowth of the view cf 
Diss. 15. cor. (at the end). There Kant had held that an 
intellectual activity results in a sensitive whole, in 
spite of the fact that the activity itself does not begin 
with the sensitive. After ]? 70, he belie ved that the 
activity of the understanding results in the same sensitive 
whole, but that it proceeds from the objects of sense (sensu- 
ous manifold) . Conception and intuition being united, there 
1.) A 291; B. 347o 
2.) Also R. 410. 
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can be no synthetic activity, unless it begin viith the 
sensuous manifold. The nature of space in both pure 
1.) 
and applied Geometry is determined by a synthesis 
which must begin v°Jith that manifold. This doctrine 
destroys the view of the eles. and cf Liss. 15 . space 
cannot precede the sensuous manifold, if it is determined 
by a synthesis which begins with that manifold. Space 
2.) 
cannot be prior to the occurrence of outer sensation, 
that is, of outer experience. Space cannot remain if the 
3.) 
objects of sense (outer appearances) be abstracted. 
4.) 
The whole cf space cannot precede and determine the darts, 
and also be determined by a synthetic activity of the 
understanding which begins with the parts. The doctrines 
of the 2-i-es. remain as doctrines for a possible understand - 
5.) 
ing. For the human underst _.nding, there is the pure 
intuition cf space in pure Geometry only as far as we have 
the sensuous manifold, Pnd contrast the pure manifold with 
it. For the human understanding, there is the pure form 
of intuition, space, in applied Geometry, only as far as 
we have the sensuous manifold of which space is the form. 
1.) A. 163 -B. 203; B. 204. 
2.) Compare Liss. 15 A. and Aes. I. 
3.) Compare Diss. 15 A. and Aes. II. 
4.) Compare Diss. 15. cor. (beginning) and Aes. B. III. 
5.) Even this is not strictly correct; see below p.126 
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In both cases, the parts of space precede the whole. 
The particular representations of space are under the 
1.) 
whole of space and not in it. Space is an aggregate. 
2.) 
I mentioned above the three possible interpreta- 
tions of Kant' s doctrine of a synthetic activity of the 
understanding from which space is abstracted. We have 
now come to the root of the d iff iculty in his conflicting 
views of space. In his thinking of 1769, and in most 
parts of .Diss. 15. , and in the hies., he developed his 
views of space from the point of view that there is no 
activity of the mind. Space is presented or given; its 
relations are contemplated. In two parts of Diss. 15., 
he said that space is abstracted from an activity of the 
mind. He made a unity of these doctrines cf space in the 
Diss. by assuming that a wholly intellectual activity 
can yield a sensitive whole chose conditions are independent 
of that activity. At that time this reconciliation was 
possible, for he maintained that there is knowledge based 
upon a synthesis which has no relation to sense -experience. 
1.) Kemp Smith, p. 96. "In principle, the whole pre- 
cedes the parts; in the process cf being brought inb 
existence as an intuition, th: pa its precede the 
whole." 
2.) pp. 1078108. 
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After 1770, in accord with his doctrine of knowledge, 
he maintained, however, that all synthesis must be sensitive. 
1.) 
It must_ proceed from something sensitive, and yield the 
sensitive whole or space. This view is app~ gently merely a 
slight alteration of the doctrine of an activity of the mind 
in Diss. 15. cor. (end) . There Kant had said that an 
intellectual activity yields a sensitive whole of space. 
`;that could be more justifiable than to say that the same 
synthetic activity proceeds from the sensitive plats (limits) 
and yields the concept of a sensitive whale of space? This 
seemed to Kant to bring space at one stroke under the condi- 
tions of conception in accordance with the doctrine that 
intuitions and concepts are inseparably bound together, and 
yet to retain the doctrines of Diss. 15. and the =yes. as true 
of space once it has been yielded by the unde rs tan l ing . 
This was Kant's view in B. 160n. Space is b nth fog n 
of intuition and .a. pure (formal) intuition, but only 
the latter gives a unity of representation. He s-_i d that 
in the . .es. he had relegated this unity to sensibility 
in order to remark that it precedes all concepts, although 
it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the 
senses) through tich all concepts of space and time are 
possible. The unity of this a priori intuition belongs 
1.) Diss. 5. 
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to space and time, and not to the concepts of the 
understanding. For through this unity (in that the under - 
standing condi tions sensibility) , space and time are for 
1.) 
the first time given. This is a doctrine which -- he 
believed -- allows a synthesis to yield space, and, at the 
same time, allows the conditions of unity to remain in 
space and time as described in Diss. 15. and in the --es. 
This solution conceals, however, a hornet's nest of 
difficulties. What is the nature cf the synthesis which 
yields space? As I have pointed out, pant could mean by 
a synthesi s any one of three types. One of these types 
is a complue return to the view of Dies. 15. cor. (end), 
and it is compatible with the rest of Diss. 15. and wit. 
the four arguments of the -les. only on the assumption of 
the dualism between sense and intelligence. The second 
type (that at B. 160n.) is compatible neither with arguments 
in the les. nor with the theory of knowledge in the Ana. 
17 "Diese Einheit hatte ich in der esthetir bloss 
zur Sinnlichkeit gezaehlt, um nur zu bemerken, dass 
sie vor allem Begriffe vorhergehe, ob sie zwar eine 
Synthesis, die nicht den Sinnen angehört, durch welche 
aber alle Begriffe von Raum und Zeit zuerst moeglich 
werden, voraussetzt. Denn da durch sie (indem der 
Verstand die Sinnlichkeit bestimmt) der baum oder die 
Zeit- als .n.schauunrmi. zuerst e eben werden, so gehoert 
die Einheit dieser Anschauung a priori zum Raurf und 
der Zeit, und nicht zum begriffe des Verstandes." 
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In fact, it is itself quite meaningless. The third is. the 
only type compatible with the theory of knowledge in the 
Ana., and it contradicts the arguments in the es. Let 
us consider these types in turn. 
1.) 
The first kind ae synthesis is intellectual and 
yields the pure intuition of space, which is entirely 
sensitive. ';Tith all of the difficulties of this dualism, 
certain advantages follow f r an. it. By assuming it, space 
is determined by two sets of conditions, each of which is 
complete in itself. Space conforms to the conditions of 
the intellect so far as it is yielded by an intellectual 
activity. The completeness of these intellectual conditions 
is disturbed in no way by the conditions of sense. Space 
conforms also to the conditions of sense. It is uniquely 
related to these conditions, as described in Di ss. 15., 
and the four arguments of the Aes . The completeness of 
these conditions of sense is disturbed in no way by the 
conditions of intellect. The lynch -pin of the structure of 
argument in Di ss. 15., and in the Aes. is this dualism 
between sense and intelligence. Granting it, the argumc is 
follow validly. Whatever be the d ifficulties wi th the 
dualism itself, its chief advantage is the support which it 
1. Diss. 15. cor.nd.1- 
-1 
lends to these fundamental arguments. Most Df the obscuri- 
ties in Kant's later teaching result from his attempt to 
retain the teaching of the lames. and of Diss. 15., and to 
discard the dualism upon which it is grounded. Many of his 
difficulties would have been avoided had he realized that 
his teaching in Diss. 15., and in the Kes. is based upon 
the dualism, and must stand or fa],l with it. Had he faced 
this fact, and retained the dualism (admitting its incom- 
patibility with his more mature views) the result would have 
been much less unsatisfactory than his teaching in B. 16 On. 
I do not mean that the doctrine of an intellectual 
synthesis, if closely analyzed, turns out to be any more 
coherent than any other doctrine of synthesis which does 
not begin with the sensuous manifold. The same criticism 
which I shall make below of the doctrine of synthesis in 
B. 160n., can be made with equal cogency against the teach- 
ing of Diss. 15. cor (end) , Granting two independent sets 
of conditions, the sensitive and the intellectual, this 
separation justifies in no way the claim that space may be 
yielded by an intellectual activity. that is the nature 
of such an activity? What is the nature of the non - 
sensitive (i.e., intellectual) elements with which it, could 
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begin? Such a question is in no way answered by the 
assumption that there is an intellectual, or non -sensitive 
intuition. Kant grants that such an intuition is possible, 
but not for man. Such "possibility" is meaningless in the 
light of the critical doctrine that only such sciences as 
pure Geometry and Mechanics are concerned with the possibility 
of knowledge . The jus tificat ion of the intellectual synthesis 
in the Diss. rests only upon the asaimption that there is 
analytical knowledge wh i ch is concerned in no way with the 
world of space and time, and that the concepts involved in 
such knowledge presuppose a synthesis which in no way involves 
the senses, or even the forms of sense- experience. This 
assumption possesses the single positive quality that it 
is not intended to be compatible with the doctrine of the 
necessary union between concepts and intuitions. Its weak- 
ness lies in the fact that even an intellectual synthesis 
must begin with something. But this weakness was obscured 
to Kant (even after 1770) by the more general quest ion: 
what kind of a content can an intellectual concept have, 
granting that it has been yielded by a synthesis? Until this 
question had been more squarely faced by Kant, it is not 
likely that he would concern himself with the problem of the 
nature of the elements with which an intellectual synthesis 
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could begin. Nor is it likely that Kant ever faced this 
problem; for with his rejection of the dualism of 1770, 
it disappears. It is almost certain that he never faced the 
problem of the origin of an intellectual synthesis which in 
no way concerns either the forms (sensitive elements) or 
the contents (sensuous elements) of experience until, 
miraculously enough, it yields the former. This problem 
is, in fact, supplanted by the similar problem which arises 
with reference to the doctrine of a second type of synthesis. 
After his rejection of the dualism of 1770 Kant formulated 
the doctrine of a second type of synthesis in the vain hope 
of retaining the Aes. as a body of teaching, in spite of 
the doctrine that concepts and intuitions necessarily.condi- 
tion each other. Instead of facing the fact that the rejec- 
tion of the dualism of 1770 involves the rejection of the 
arguments of the Aes., Kant formulated in B. 160 n. a doctrine 
of synthesis which he believed to be compatible with the 
teachings of the Aes. and the Ana. He believed that 
in spite of the union between concetion and intuition, 
he could work out a doctrine of synthesis which would 
leave the arguments of the Aes. intact. The result 
is a meaningless doctrine compatible neither with 
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the union of conception and intuition nor i th the argu- 
ments of the 4es . In B. 160n., he said that a synthesis 
yields a sensitive whole of spac . This synthesis cannot 
be intellectual, for there can be no isolation of conception 
from intuition. It must , theref ore , not only yield the 
sensitive whole of space, but it must begin with something 
sensitive. '_et i t does not -- Kant claimed -- begin with 
the sensuous manifold. The obvious question (which he 
a,cparently never faced) is: If such a synthesis is not 
intellectual, and does not begin with the sensuous manifold, 
1.) 
with what does it begin? There may be some justifica- 
tion for Kant's omission of this Question in 1770, when 
his isolation of sense -. -.nd intellect left open -- as he 
admitted -- many quest ions concerning the nature of the 
latter. But in 1781 it was quite different. His union of 
conception and intuition involves necessarily the problem 
of the nature of the synthetic activity of the mind which 
yields space. His insistence that space is yielded by a 
synthesis is equaled only by his persistent omission of the 
ouestion concerning the nature of the elements with which 
such an activity could begin. Had he faced this ouestion, 
he would have realized that a synthesis must begin either 
1.) Compare - emp Smith, p. 97. "Nor does (Kant) show what 
the simple elements are from which the synthesis of 
apprehension and reproduction in pule intuition might 
start." 
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with the sensuous manifold, in which case, it is preceded 
and determined by that manifold, or it must begin wi th 
the very thing it is supposed to yield, namely, space. In 
the latter case, the doctrine of synthesis is not only in- 
compatible with the teachings cf the _yes . , but it is quite 
meaningless. If a pure manifold, space, is given with 
which a synthesis may begin, then space is not derived from 
the synthesis, but precedes and determines it. Either 
there is no pure manifold given with which a synthesis can 
begin, or space is prior to all synthesis. In the former 
(which means a return to the dualism of 1770) 
case, there can be no synthesis unless it is intellectual,/ 
or unless it begins with the sensuous manifold. A pure 
manifold is "space" as much before a. synthetic activity as 
1.) 
afterwards. A particular space is "space" as much as 
a greater (or smaller) particular spe..ce. Gr ,nted a pure 
manifold, then space does not presuppose a synthesis of 
any sort. Granted a pure manifold, then s wace is prior to 
sense -experience, the parts of space are limits, and all 
particular representations of space are in it and not 
under it. To assume a manifold (other than the sensuous 
manifold) from vdaich a synthetic activity can begin is to 
restate the arguments of Diss. 15. and of the yes. which 
preclude any synthetic activity. To assume that a synthetic 
1.) See above pp. 91-92. 
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activity yields space is to deny th at a manifold from 
which it began is pure. A synthetic activity must begin 
with the sensuous nBnifold. 
The only possible type of synthesis of the understand- 
ing which can yield space is one which begins with the 
sensuous manifold. Such a synthesis is the only one which 
is compatible with Kant's teaching in the Ana. It is an 
essential part of that teaching. This doctrine al' synthesis 
1.) 
contradicts the four arguments of the .Aes . If it 
begins with the sensuous manifold and yields space, then 
the sensuous manifold is prior to space. Space is not 
prior to but later than sense -experience. This contradicts 
Diss. 15. A., and pies. I. If the objects of the sensuous 
2.) 
manifold are abstracted, nothing remains. This contra- 
l.) Hartmann, p. 154, quoted by Vaihinger II, p. 228. 
"Diese Erklaerungen (in B 160n.) genuegen, um Kants 
Schlussfolgerung in ihr Gegentheil zu verkehren. 
Wenn der einige Raun als gegebenes Ganzes erst Product 
einer vom Verstande ausgefuehrten Synthese des 
raeumlichen Mannigfaltigen ist, so ist er spaeter als 
diese, aber nicht frueher; es muessen dann die durch 
die sinnliche Anschauungsform allein aus der Empfindung 
formirten endlichen Anschauungen (das raeumliche 
Mannigfaltige) das fruehere sein, aus welchem erst 
der einige Raum sich bilden kann, und nimmermehr koennen 
sie ihrer Enstehung nach blosse Einschraenkungen dessen 
sein, was erst vermittelst ihrer zu Stande kommen 
kann, indem der Verstand sich dieses ihm gegebenen 
Stoffes combinatorisch bemaechtigt. Kant hat leider 
nicht bemerkt, dass er in dieser Anmerkung zur 2. 
Aufl. der Analytik selbst seine fruehere verkehrte 
Auffassung ueberwunden und berichtigt hat." 
2.) See above p. 119. 
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diets Diss. 15. 1 . and ses. H. If space is yielded by 
a synthetic activity of the understanding which begins 
with the sensuous manifold, then the parts of space are 
prior to the whole , and determine- it. The whole is me rely 
an aggregate. Particular representations are not in space, 
but under it, just as usual particulars determine usual 
general concepts. This contradicts Aes. B. III., and B. IV. 
This is the view of space to which Kant came if his doctrine 
of a synthesis is to accord with his theory of knowledge in 
the vina. Unless there is a dualism between conception and 
intuition, as in Kant's view in the piss., the sensuous 
manifold is prior to space, space does not remain after the 
objects of sense have been abstracted, and the parts of 
space precede and determine the whole. The only other 
possibility for Kant was a return to the view of the Diss., 
and a separation of conception and intuition into independent 
faculties. Such a doctrine of synthesis as in B. 160 n. is 
meaningless, and is compatible neither with the teaching cff 
the Aes. nor with that of the Ana. 
Cassirer points out a unity in the diversity of 
Kañt's doctrines in the Aes. and Ana. Intuitions and con- 
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ceptions -- Cassirer says -- are inseparable , but they 
may be treated as separated. In the synthetic construction 
of knowledge, an intuition conditioning an object can in 
no way be separated from the functions of thought. On 
the other hand, the is no logical contradiction involved, 
no violation of the highest principle of analytical judg- 
1.) 
ments in treating them as separated. The diversity 
in the Critique lies in the fact that in the hes. , 
intuitions and conceptions are treated as separated, while 
in the Ana., they are treated as joined. Cassirer forgets 
that there is no more evidence in the Aes. that Kant 
believed that they are actually joined and treated them 
as if they could be separated, than there is evidence in 
the Ana. that Kant believed that they are separable and 
treated then as if they were necessarily joined. 
There is sane justification for interpreting the doctrines 
of the Aes. from the point of view of the Ana. The latter 
1.) (II. p. 700.) "Die Anschauung kann im synthetischen 
Aufbau der Erkenntnis, sofern also durch sie ein 
Gegenstand gegeben und bestimmt werden soll, die 
Denkfunktion freilich in keiner Weise entbehren; 
dagegen bedeutet es zum mindesten keinen logischen 
Widerspruch, bedeutet es keinen Verstoss gegen 
den obersten Grundsatz aller analytischén Urtheile, 
sie von ihr losgeloest zu denken." 
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is a more ma tuse one. Kant's development was not, 
however, a steady advance from the teachings of the 'Les. 
to those of the Ina. His original contrast in 1769 
between the concept of srece and the usual general con- 
cepts is more compatible with -the view of the Ana., than 
1.) 
with the view of the les . s Cassirer remarks, Kant 
believed space to be a concept of the underst_nding and a 
principle of synthesis before he believed it to be a pure 
intuition. The doctrines of the .na. , are the culmination 
(Nears later) of Kant's search in 1769 into the differences 
between general concepts, of a certain type, and space and 
time whose natum involves ce rtain synthetic processes 
of the mind. In Dies. 15. he relegated to the Corollary 
the doctrine of a synthetic activity which detemairE s space 
his discovery concerning 
because /the nature of mathematical truth led him to over- 
state his doctrine of pure intuition. In the = -es . , he 
worked out the doctrine of pure intuition, ignoring 
Completely his <.octrine ar a synthetic activity which deter- 
raines space. In the = na., with the surrender at' his dualism, 
and his return to the theory of an activity of the mind 
which yields space, he returned to a view quite similar to 
one that he had held 
the/ in his investigation in 1769 of space as a concept of 
1.) Cassirer II, p. 625n. 
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the understanding. His teaching in the Ana. gives 
us the first satisfactory logical treatment cf space in 
contrast to general concepts. In this way, his views in 
the Bina. may be considered the culmination af his think- 
ing of 1769. The doctrines in the Ana. may be considered 
Kant's more mature ones, but this does not mean that he 
of 
arrived at all /them after writing the Aes. 
Cassirer realizes that in the Aes. Kant says one 
thing, and in the Ana., he says another. The genuine sepa- 
ration of concepts and intuitions in the Aes. becomes the 
logical correlation -in they Ana. 
"So loest sich die anfaengliche Trennung von 
Anschauung und Begriff immer deutlicher in 
eine reine logische Korrelation auf. Die 
Unterscheidung, die die transzendentale 
Aesthetik an die Spitze stellt, betrifft 
zunaechst nur die Absonderung von den 
gewoehlichen Gattungsbegriff en." (II. 698.) 
If we could_ overlook the wording of the "es. and piss. 15., 
and interpret Kant's teaching solely in the liht of his 
conclusions in the Ana., we might readily claim that he 
was concerned only with the logical nature of space from 
the time of his original contrast of space and general con- 
cepts in 1769 until the publication cf the Critique. Such 
an interpretation would ig n ore the discovery in 1769 -70 
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that truth in Geometry and Mechanics is a priori and 
synthetic, as well as the wording of the arguments in Diss. 
15., and the -es. Vie cannot claim that there is a unity 
of the doctrines of space in the Critique whatever signi- 
ficance the teachings cf tlE es . retain if viewed as a 
logical treatment of the concept of space . In denying 
this unity to the Critique, I wish to undervalue in no way 
the interpretation vhich Cassirer gives to the Ana. I wish 
merely to emphasize that, after all, it is only the point 
of view of the t1na. of which he speaks. His treatment of 
Kant's development takes account of many of Kant' s changes 
of doctrine. Fran the point of view of the .ana., the con- 
ditions of conception are dependent upon the intuitions of 
space and time, and the conditions of sensibility are 
dependent upon the categories. In the act of knowledge, 
the categories are bound to intuition. Vie may abstract 
from the conditions of knowledge , and arrive at the condi- 
tions of sensibility apart from the coral tions of knowledge. 
This doctrine is impoirtant whether or not the c ondi ti ons rf 
sensibility referred to here are the conditions described 
in the ries. To make such an abstraction, laying bare the 
conditions of sensibility, is a valid procedure logically. 
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In -this way, we do not set up the conditions of knowledge, 
but only certain con:'itions which knowledge ca, not contra- 
dict. The contrast between "man" and "space" is between 
two determinants of our knowledge. In the contrast, one 
i s as far removed from the conditions of knowledge as the 
other, yet knowledge cannot go counter t o the results of 
this contrast. Such a contrast may be called knowledge 
in form. It bears the s: -me relation to knowledge as pure 
Geometry does to applied, or as pure Paiechanics to applied. 
1.) 
It will be remembered that pure Geometry, according to 
Kant's teaching after 1770, is knowledge in form, remlt- 
ing from the application of camelots to the pure intuitions 
of space and time. It is not knowledge, but by means of 
it the limiting conditions cf knowledge are determined. 
ie may describe "space" as isolated from the conditions 
of conception. e may describe the categories as isolated 
from the conditions of sensibility. Such descriptions do 
not concern the conditions of knowledge , but only certain 
conditions which knowledge carrot contradict. Such des- 
criptions are the "pure Geometry" of knowledge. This is 
the significance of the arguments of the Aes. if they be 
interpreted only fron the point of view of the i ;na. This 
1.1 See above, p. 113 . 
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is the unity which can be pointed out in the diversity 
oî Kant' s doctrines in the "es . and 4yna. The value 
of such an interpretation is obvious. Its disadvantage 
is that by simplification it omits as much of Kant's 
teaching as it includes. As Professor Kemp Smith says: 
"The Critique contains too great a variety of tendencies, 
too rich a complexity of issues, to allow such a simpli- 
fication." Treated from neither particular point cif view, 
the doctrines of the tina. remain in fundamental contrast 
tho se of the "es. 
Kant failed to unify his doctrines of space in the 
Critique. Space is either prior to the manifold of 
sense:- in which case, it is not determined by any kind 
of synthesis; or space is determined by synthesis which 
begins with the prim' existing manifold cf sense. The 
first is the teaching cf Diss. 15.11., and Aes. I.; the 
second is the teaching of the .na. Either space remains 
after the objects á sense have been abstracted, or 
nothing remains after they have been abstracted. The 
first is the view of Diss. 15. x., and Aes. II; the 
second is the viev of the 11na. Either the whole of space 
determines the parts:- in which case, there is no 
1.) 
1.) Kemp Smi th , p . 102 . 
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synthesis; or the parts precede the whole, and it is 
determined by a synthesis of then.. If the whole (aggregate) 
has been reached by a synthesis, then it cannot precede 
the parts, but is preceded and determined by them. If the 
synthesis is carried further , a new whole results, and 
what had. been -previously considered as the whole, is found 
to have been merely an aggregate, determined by the extent 
of the previous synthesis of the parts. Space cannot pre- 
suppose an activity of the understanding (even in pure 
Geometry) unless the parts determine the whole. This con - 
1.) 
tradicts Di ss. 15 . C. n. and 15. cor. (first -paragraph). 
Space cannot presuppose an activity of the understanding 
unless particular representations cf space are under "s -pac t? 
1 
and not in it. This contradicts Aes. B. IV. 
Kant was trying t o hunt with the hounds - nd run with 
the hare. He was trying to show that space is prior to 
the sensuous manifold, and yet that space presupposes a 
synthesis. He was trying to show that the parts of space 
are dependent upon the whole, and yet to say that the whole 
of space is determined by a synthesis cf the parts. It 
cannot be done. His attempt to combine these views failed. 
His only alternative was the view of the Diss. that the 
1.) \faihinger, II. 170; 228 -229. 
condi tions of synthesis can be entire ly intelle ctual, 
and that the conditions of the resulting whole can be en- 
tirely sensitive. On such a view, sense and intellect 
are dogn.atically assuned to be separate and c ararle te in 
themselves. But in the -0.na. where they are b ornad inseparably 
together, the assumption is false. 
These conflicting views of space in the L%ritipue 
make clearer the two views of space in Diss. 15 . In 1770, 
Kant could answer Euler s Question in two ways . üpace is 
not abstracted from sensation; in reference to the 
sensible world, it is not abstracted at all. There is, 
harever, an intellectual synthesis which yields it. It is 
determined by this synthesis. Kant reconciled these two 
answers by means of the dualism of 1770. To know the 
sensible world, the mind requires only intuitions. Knowls dge 
of the sensible viorld is synthetic, and not analytic. On 
the other hand, to know the intelligible, real v.,crld, the 
mind requires only concepts . Knowle dge of the intelligible 
world is analytic and not synthetic. These two kinds of 
knowledge do not overlap. 
1.) 
In every section of Di ss . 15. save two Kant treated 
the pui intuition of space as presented or contemplated, 
1.) 
and not constructed. In two Tarts he treated it as 
1.) See above pp. 104 -107 
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yielded by an activity of the mind. By following out 
this assura.ption, he discovered the weakness in his dualisms 
At the end of the Corollary, he suggested that the corn epts 
of space and time, which are not abstracted from sense, 
and which are not gained by r cf le c Lion (like the usual 
general concepts) aree abstracted. from an activity of the 
mind on the occasion of sensation. He assumed tib.t an 
intellectual activity can yield a sensitive whole. after 
1770, he realiz ed that this is impos sible. He realized, 
however, that the fault lay not in the assumption of an 
activity of the mind, but in the deeper assumption of a 
thoroughgoing dualism. The assumption of an activity of 
the mind must -- he realized -- be r,:.taired, but the 
dualism rejected. He could not isolate contention and 
intuition. There is an activity of t'he understanding 
mhi ch begins with the manifold c sense and w hi ch deter- 
mines space. The understanding represents space as a pure 
manifold (in pure Mathematics) in contrast to the sensuous 
manifold; and as a pure form of the sensuous manifold 
(in applied Mathematics.) . At the end cf the Corollary 
to hiss. 15., rant was correct in saying that there is an 
activity of the mind. He was wrong Only in regard to its 
nature. The rest of JJiss. 15. is based upon the false 
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assumption that there is no activity of the mini. Diss. 
15., as a whole, is based upon the false assumption 
that conception and intuition can be isolated. The doctrine 
that space is prior to sensation is based also upon this 
false assumption. The doctrine that the whole of space 
determines the parts is based also upon it. The sane is 
true of the doctrine that an infinite number of representa- 
tions are in space instead of under it. Once Kant cor- 
rected this assumption, and joined conceptions and intuitions, 
the representations cf space and time are subjected to the 
conditions of conception as well as to the conditions of 
sense. He could preserve the doctrines of space in the 
es . only by reverting to the point_ of view of the Dissertation 
and separating conception from intuition. He would never 
have done this. He retained the views of the hes. , 
either because he did not realize that he had contradicted 
them; or because, realizing it, he knew that the alteration 
required was too far - reaching to be undertaken. 
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